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THE TRADE SYSTEM AND CLIMATE AC-
TION: WAYS FORWARD UNDER THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT  
Susanne Droege, Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das and Michael Mehling 
INTRODUCTION 
The Paris Agreement established a new international framework for the parties to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) from 
2020 onwards. Climate policy will be based on national contributions to mitigation, 
adaptation, and financial, technological and capacity-building support. At the inter-
national level, regular reviews of national efforts will help strengthen transparency 
and are expected to drive national ambitions to meet the goal of keeping the global 
average temperature increase below two degrees Celsius, compared to pre-indus-
trial levels. In order to achieve success, this new regime needs support from other 
policy regimes. The trade policy agenda is among the most important because trade 
liberalization can, on the one hand, promote the uptake of climate-friendly goods 
and services and foster the deployment of clean technologies; however, on the other 
hand, national climate policy measures can collide with trade rules due to conflict-
ing principles and priorities.  
Countries following up on their nationally-determined contributions 
(NDCs) will need access to clean technologies, not only in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy production, but in all areas where harmful greenhouse gases re-
quire abatement. At the same time, national climate policy measures can collide 
with trade rules due to conflicting principles and priorities, e.g., protectionism, and 
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these trade rules therefore need to be discussed and evaluated with a view to their 
potential to support climate policy without compromising trade. 
The political climate in two important regions, the European Union (EU) 
and in the United States (US), has changed considerably since the entry into force 
of the Paris Agreement on November 4, 2016. With the newly elected US President 
Donald J. Trump in office, US climate policy and liberalized trade both have come 
under pressure under WKH³$PHULFD)LUVW´DSSURDFKendorsed by the President and 
his administration. This may have severe ramifications for the implementation of 
international climate policy,1 with deregulation emerging as a key prong of the new 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSROLFLHVas well as looming threats to withdraw from the interna-
tional climate regime. 7KH 86¶V FXUUHQW DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ significantly implicates 
trade policy, considering President Trump already withdrew from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership on his fourth day in office. These changes pose new challenges for trade 
and climate policy interactions, as exemplified by the international reactions to a 
potential US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. 
As climate policy has become a major field in international policy, its stand-
ing vis-à-vis the well-established World Trade Organization (WTO) regime is 
changing rapidly. With the increasing importance of national measures following 
the adoption of the Paris Agreement, synergies and conflicts can be expected to 
change over time. An indicator of such adjustments are WTO disputes that have 
emerged in recent years, which center on renewable energy production and trade in 
related goods and services. The inclusion of environmental and climate policy pro-
visions in regional trade agreements (RTAs) further show there is a demand for 
policy coordination. 
This article reviews the interactions between climate and trade policy by 
providing an overview of the two regimes, focusing on legal and political dimen-
VLRQV,QSDUWLFXODUZHDVVHVVWKHLQWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHFOLPDWHUHJLPH¶VSROLF\
measures with the trade regime of the WTO, as well as aspects that emerge from 
RTAs. We focus on the question of how the international trade regime could sup-
port efforts in tackling climate change. 
Part I introduces climate change and trade regimes (including the WTO and 
RTAs). Part II gives an overview of the trade rules and their relevance for climate 
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policy. Part III illustrates the interactions between international and national cli-
mate policy approaches and trade policies. Part IV summarizes suggested solutions 
to avoid conflicts and strengthen synergies between the regimes. 
II. THE CLIMATE AND TRADE REGIMES: AN OVERVIEW 
A. THE CLIMATE REGIME 
The UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 at the Rio Conference on Environment 
and Development.2 With 196 parties, it has nearly universal participation.3 It sets 
RXW WKHPDLQREMHFWLYHRI WKHFOLPDWHUHJLPHDV³VWDELOL]DWLRQRIJUHHQKRXVHJDV
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system.´4 However, the Convention did not 
specify legal obligations to achieve this objective. In 1995, parties started negotiat-
ing a protocol to stipulate mitigation targets for developed countries. This led to the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which now has 192 parties.5 The Protocol 
requires industrialized countries to collectively reduce average greenhouse gas 
emissions by 5.2% during 2008±12 (i.e., the first commitment period), compared 
to 1990 levels.6 As an innovative next step, it introduced several market-based in-
VWUXPHQWV ³IOH[LEOHPHFKDQLVPV´ WRDOORZIRUFRVW-effective mitigation.7 While 
developing countries signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol, they do not have any 
concrete obligations to reduce their emissions. With the 2012 Doha Amendment to 
the Kyoto Protocol, parties agreed on a new commitment period for 2013±20.8 
However, the amendment has yet to enter into force. 
Throughout the history of the climate regime, a recurring question has been 
who should act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and how the effort to address 
climate change should be shared. The UNFCCC establishes the principle of com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, which was ini-
tially translated into a bifurcated division of Annex I (developed countries) and 
non-Annex I countries (developing countries).9 The Kyoto Protocol followed this 
                                                 
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-
38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].   
3 See id. 
4 Id. at art. 2. 
5 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 
1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 UNFCCC, supra note 2, at art. 4. 
approach, which only required Annex I countries to mitigate emissions.10 As the 
pressure rose quickly to broaden participation of countries²particularly major 
emerging economies such as China, which surpassed the US DVWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVW
emitter in the late 2000s²in mitigation efforts, parties launched negotiations on a 
new climate treaty under the UNFCCC with the Bali Road Map in 2007.11 The 
purpose of a new agreement was to establish a genuinely global effort for long-term 
climate policy. In 2009, after the 15th UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (herein-
DIWHU³&23´Ln Copenhagen did not succeed in adopting a new global agreement, 
12 it took another six years of negotiations to find a consensus in Paris at COP21.13 
The Paris Agreement was adopted by the 196 parties to the UNFCCC on 
December 12, 2015, is signed by 194 states, and is ratified by over 120 states.14 The 
Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016.15 Its purpose is threefold: (1) 
WROLPLWWKHJOREDODYHUDJHWHPSHUDWXUHLQFUHDVHWR³ZHOOEHORZ´GHJUHHV&HOVLXV
above pre-iQGXVWULDOOHYHOVDQG³WRSXUVXHHIIRUWV´WRDFKLHYHGHJUHHV&HOVLXV
(2) to enhance the ability to adapt to climate change, to increase the resilience and 
to establish low-greenhouse gas development; and (3) to make financial flows con-
sistent with a low emissions pathway and climate resilient development.16 Unlike 
the Kyoto Protocol, the core obligations under the Paris Agreement apply univer-
sally to all UNFCCC parties, not just developed country parties.17 The Paris Agree-
ment requires all parties to prepare and communicate nationally determined contri-
butions (NDCs) which must be reviewed and updated every five years, with each 
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12 See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference ±December 2009, http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/meeting/6295.php 
(noting the parties made significant progress towards common climate goals (for example. keeping 
temperature rise under two degrees Celsius) but did not reach an actual agreement as to the execution 
of those goals).  
13 See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Climate Change Confer-
ence± November 2015, http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/session/9057/php/view/deci-
sions.php#c (noting the parties reached an actual agreement as to how best to implement the goals 
of the aforementioned 15th COP). For an overview of the new regime, see Susanne Droege, The 
Paris Agreement 2015: Turning Point for the International Climate Regime, GERMAN INSTITUTE 
FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS (Feb. 2016).  
14 See Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, 2016 T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement], 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/266403.pdf.  
15 See id. 
16 See id. at art. 2. 
17 See id. at art. 3. 
new NDC required to be more ambitious than the previous one.18 The Agreement 
further specifies actions in regard to adaptation ofNDCs, as well as obligations re-
ODWHGWRWKH³PHDQVRILPSOHPHQWDWLRQ´LH, financial, technological, and capacity-
building support).19 Although the contents of NDCs are up to parties, the Agree-
ment puts in place several mechanisms to review implementation and progress 
made, including a transparency framework to review NDC implementation, a 
mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance, and a five-yearly 
global assessment to review collective progress.20 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both include explicit references to 
trade policy concerns. The language used is partly identical to that found in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),21 aimed at preventing protec-
tionist applications of climate policy measures.22 The Paris Agreement, by contrast, 
does not contain any references to trade, mainly due to diverging positions of de-
veloped and developing countries.23 Following the Bali Action Plan in 2007, pro-
posals by developing countries surfaced to include text in an international agree-
ment that would prohibit developed countries from using unilateral trade measures 
on climate grounds.24 However, such proposals were usually accompanied by coun-
ter-proposals by developed countries to include no text on the issue at all.25 
To offer institutional space for discussing such critical issues, in 2010 the 
parties created a forum regarding the impact of the implementation and response 
                                                 
18 See id. at art. 4. In 2015, parties to the UNFCCC submitted their intended nationally determined 
contributions (INDCs), which must be updated and turned into NDCs under the Paris Agreement. 
19 See id. at art. 9-11. 
20 See id. at art. 13-15. 
21 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [herein-
after GATT]. Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC (1992) states FOLPDWHSROLF\PHDVXUHVVKRXOGQRW³FRQVWL
tute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade.´ 
22 UNFCCC, supra note 2, at art. 3. 
23 See Paris Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 3. 
24 See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Proposals by India for inclusion of 
additional agenda items in the provisional agenda of the seventeenth session of the Conference of 
the Parties, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2011/INF.2/Add.1, at 7 (Oct. 7, 2011). 
25 See HARRO VAN ASSELT, THE FRAGMENTATION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: CONSE-
QUENCES AND MANAGEMENT OF REGIME INTERACTIONS (2014); Nicholas Chan, The New Impacts 
of the Implementation of Climate Change Response Measures, REV. OF EUR., COMP. & INT¶L ENVTL 
L., 228, 234-35 (2016). 
measures .26 Because the Paris Agreement does not give guidance on trade and cli-
mate change, the forum is the primary institutional space for ongoing discussions 
on trade-related concerns in the context of the UNFCCC.27 The work of the forum 
must WDNHLQWRDFFRXQW³DOOUHOHYDQWSROLF\LVVXHVRIFRQFHUQ.´28 Although the work 
program of the forum does not directly tackle the climate-trade overlap, technical 
work on assessing the impacts of response measures suggest trade-related impacts 
will be considered.29 In particular, the UNFCCC guidance on the impact assessment 
of response measures on developing countries mentions trade impacts from tariffs 
and border carbon adjustments (BCAs).30 
B. THE WORLD TRADE REGIME 
1. THE WTO 
The origins of the world trade regime date back to 1947 when GATT was 
adopted.31  Nearly half a century later, the WTO was established following the con-
clusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986±94).  The WTO, with its 
164 members, is the institutional umbrella of a series of six sub-categories of agree-
ments, including fourteen agreements on trade in goods (e.g. GATT) and five other 
types of agreements, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
and the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).32 
The key objective of the GATT is to promote the liberalization of trade in 
goods for the benefit of its members.33  It sets out a number of trade principles, 
                                                 
26 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, U.N. DOC. 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, (Mar. 15, 2011). 
27 See UNFCCC, supra note 2, at art. 4; Paris Agreement supra note 14, at art 4.15; Ralph Bodle et 
al., The Paris Agreement: Analysis, Assessment and Outlook,  GERMAN FED. ENV¶T AGENCY 20 
(2016); Chan, supra note 25, at 228-37. 
28 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2 (Jan. 29, 2016). 
29 See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Forum on the Impact of the Im-
plementation of Response Measures, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/re-
sponse_measures/items/7418.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
30 See U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, supra note 26, at Sec. III, Sub-Sec. A. 
31 See GATT, supra note 21. 
32 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization annex 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Agreement Establishing WTO]. 
33 See GATT, supra note 21. 
most notably that trade measures imposed by a member shall not discriminate be-
tween different trade partners (known as the most-favored nation (MFN) obliga-
tion).34  Neither shall trade measures discriminate against imported goods from 
other members vis-à-YLV ³OLNH´ GRPHVWLF JRRGV WKH QDWLRQDO WUHDWPHQW REOLJD
tion).35  These key non-discrimination principles were derived from the concept of 
comparative advantage, which increases welfare for two reasons: countries can spe-
cialize in products for which they have abundant resources, and with higher pro-
duction there will be economies of scale.  Free trade also allows a country to benefit 
from a wider variety of consumer goods offered by producers from other countries. 
Although initial rounds of trade talks under the GATT were devoted to 
bringing down tariffs, later negotiation rounds (starting with the Tokyo Round, 
1973±79) broadened the scope to non-tariff barriers, such as import licensing, rules 
of origin, and investment measures.36  Over time, the multilateral trade regime came 
to cover new areas, such as services,37 intellectual property rights,38 technical stand-
ards,39 and subsidies.40 
An important feature of the WTO is its strong dispute settlement mecha-
QLVPZKLFKH[WHQGVWKH*$77¶VSUDFWLFH41  Under the integrated system of dispute 
settlement created alongside the WTO, the same dispute settlement rules apply to 
disputes under virtually all WTO agreements, subject to any special or additional 
rules in an individual agreement.42  The politically desirable outcome of a dispute 
is a resolution of the conflict through consultations, or, more generally, a solution 
mutually acceptable to the parties to the dispute.  If this is not possible, the next 
primary objective of the process is to withdraw the measure under contention, with 
                                                 
34 Id. at art. I.  More specifically, a WTO member is obliged to provide to another WTO member 
WUHDWPHQWZKLFKLV³QROHVVIDYRXUDEOH´WKDQZKDWLWDFFRUGVWRDQ\RWKHUFRXQWU\LUUHVSHFWLYHRI
whether that country is a WTO member. 
35 Id. at art. III. 
36 See GATT, supra note 21. 
37 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S., 33 I.L.M. 1167 
[hereinafter GATS].  
38 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
39 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter 
TBT]. 
40 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 
[hereinafter SCM]. 
41 Agreement Establishing WTO, supra note 32, at art. III. 
42 Id. at Annex 2 7KH:72¶V'LVSXWH6HWWOHPHQW8QGHUVWDQGLQJ (DSU) specifies the scope of 
MXULVGLFWLRQ RI WKH :72 GLVSXWH VHWWOHPHQW PHFKDQLVP OLPLWLQJ LW WR WKH ³FRYHUHG DJUHHPHQWV´
listed in Article 1.1. 
compensation and retaliation being avenues of last resort.43  In contrast to the 
*$77¶VGLSORPDWLFQRUPVZKLFKZHUHFULWLFL]HGIRUODFNLQJWKHteeth necessary to 
ensure compliance, the dispute settlement mechanism has been described as ³WKH
most developed dispute settlement system in any existing treaty regime.´44  The 
system has been used intensively since the WTO came into being: the total 500 
disputes over the 20-year history of the WTO is in stark contrast to the 300 total 
disputes brought under the dispute settlement system of the GATT²the predeces-
sor to the WTO²over a period of 47 years, from 1947±94.45  
In 2001, a new round of trade talks, known as the Doha Development 
Round, was launched to expressly address issues of importance to developing coun-
tries.  The Doha Round includes negotiations on the reduction or elimination of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers on environmental goods and services, and paragraph 
31 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration acknowledges the relationship between ex-
isting WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral environmen-
tal agreements.46  7KH 'RKD 5RXQG QHJRWLDWLRQV XVH D ³VLQJOH XQGHUWDNLQJ´ DS
proach where countries agree on all issues together.47  This prevents countries from 
cherry-picking issues, but makes consensus more challenging.  The Doha Round 
largely came to a halt in 2008, and little progress has been made since then.  Nev-
ertheless, WTO PHPEHUVPDQDJHG WR UHDFKDJUHHPHQWRQ WKH³%DOL SDFN
DJH´48 DQGWKH³1DLURELSDFNDJH´49  However, at the Nairobi Ministerial in 
2015, important disagreements persisted among WTO members on the best way 
forward, leading to a stalemate in the trade talks.50 
Multilateral trade ambitions have faded since the 1990s due to a host of 
factors, such as emerging markets, shifting powers, and related national and re-
gional interests, all on top of the large number of trade-related issues that are more 
                                                 
43 DANIEL T. SHEDD ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20088, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO): AN OVERVIEW 3 (2012),. 
44 David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System, 24 FORDHAM INT¶L L. J. 444, 479 (2000).  
45 WTO Director-General, WTO Annual Report 2016 102 (2016), https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep16_chap6_e.pdf.  
46 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
47 Id. at 47. 
48 World Trade Organization, The Bali Ministerial Declaration of 7 December 2013, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(13)/DEC (2013) (covering trade facilitation, food security in developing countries, and 
cotton trade). 
49 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions of 19 December 2015, WTO 
Doc. WT/MIN(15)/45±WT/L/980 (2015) (including an agreement to eliminate agricultural export 
subsidies). 
50 Overview of Outcomes RI:72¶Vth Ministerial in Nairobi, ICTSD BRIDGES DAILY UPDATE, 
No. 5, at 1 (Dec. 19, 2015).  
complicDWHG WR QHJRWLDWH WKDQ WDULII UDWHV  *HQHUDOO\ WKH :72¶V UHOHYDQFH IRU
global trade has always depended on the willingness of WTO members to bring 
negotiations forward.  Contrary to its diminishing relevance in international trade 
law-PDNLQJWKH:72¶VGispute settlement system is still a very strong institutional 
tool, and is used regularly by members.  Given concerns about climate policy 
PHDVXUHV¶SRWHQWLDO WRYLRODWH:72UXOHVGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQW WDNHVDNH\UROH LQ
providing legal clarity in cases of conflict (see also Part II.C). 
By contrast, the number of RTAs has risen sharply.  RTAs, of which mega-
regional agreements are a sub-category, have to be notified to the WTO in accord-
ance with Article XXIV of GATT.51  In addition, under the WTO umbrella, there 
are two stand-alone plurilateral agreements, as well as plurilateral agreements that 
extend concessions to all WTO members on an MFN basis. The ongoing negotia-
tions on a plurilateral Environmental Goods Agreement fall in the latter category, 
meaning the benefits of the agreement will apply to all WTO members once it is 
adopted. 
Environmental concerns are acknowledged in the preamble to the 1995 
Agreement Establishing the WTO, which contextualizes the goals of the trade re-
JLPHVRDVWR³>DOORZ@IRUWKHRSWLPDOXVHRIWKHZRUOG¶VUHVRXUFHVLQDFFRUGDQFH
ZLWKWKHREMHFWLYHRIVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW´52  7KH:72¶V&RPPLWWHHRQ7UDGH
and Environment (CTE) offers the institutional setting for elaborating the relation-
ship between trade measures and environmental measures and for promoting sus-
tainable development within the WTO.  The CTE is open to all WTO members and 
to observers from intergovernmental organizations, including the UNFCCC Secre-
tariat.  Since the start of the Doha Round, the CTE has convened in Special Sessions 
to discuss the environmental aspects of the Doha Development Agenda.  However, 
in recent years, limited progress has been made, in part due to the general stalemate 
in the Doha Agenda, and also due to developments at the regional level (as dis-
cussed below).  Although climate change hardly was featured in WTO discussions 
until 2007, under the leadership of WTO Director General Pascal Lamy (2005±13), 
the organization became actively involved in discussions on the climate and trade 
interface, notably leading to a joint report with the United Nations Environment 
Programme on the subject in 2009.53  Since the 1990s, the interface between trade 
and the environment²including, more recently, climate change²has come to the 
fore primarily through GATT/WTO case law.  Although individual cases have not 
                                                 
51 See GATT, supra note 21. 
52 Agreement Establishing WTO, supra note 321, preamble. 
53 WTO Secretariat and U.N. Environmental Programme, Trade and Climate Change: A Report by 
the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Trade Organization, WTO ISBN 978-
92-870-3522-6 (2009). 
led to major frictions between the two regimes, the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement, with nationally driven climate action as a key approach, will lead to 
further demand for discussing and clarifying how the regimes could interact in a 
productive way (see Part IV). 
2. REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
During the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, many GATT members 
turned to regional or bilateral trade agreements.  The formation and strengthening 
of major trade blocs in the Americas (i.e., the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) and Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR)) and Europe in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s incentivized other countries to either join or to establish 
their own agreements.54  Against the backdrop of globalization, RTAs were per-
ceived to help enhance market access, promote foreign policy objectives, and in-
fluence the policies of trading partners.55  As a result, the number of RTAs has 
LQFUHDVHG VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQ WKH ODVW WZRGHFDGHV OHDGLQJ WR D ³VSDJKHWWL ERZO´RI
trade agreements.56  By February 2016, the WTO received 625 notifications of 
RTAs, 419 of which were in force at that time, compared to 124 notifications to the 
GATT between 1948 and 1994.57 
In recent years, the discussion of regionalism in the trade context has taken 
a new turn with the emergence of ³PHJD-UHJLRQDO´DJUHHPHQWV58 Negotiations on 
the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) were 
concluded in August 2014, but only obtained EU approval after intense political 
struggles in 2016. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP, bringing together Australia, 
Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, 
                                                 
54 Richard E. Baldwin, The Causes of Regionalism, 20 THE WORLD ECONOMY 865, 870±71 (1997). 
55 See generally Theresa Carpenter, A Historical Perspective on Regionalism, in MULTILATERALIZ-
ING REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 13, 13±27 (Richard Baldwin 
& Patrick Low eds., 2009). 
56 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15 THE WORLD ECONOMY 535, 535±
556 (1992). 
57 See WTO, Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements in the World, 1948±2016, Regional Trade 
Agreements: Facts and Figures, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2017). 
58 Rep. of the World Economic Forum, Global Agenda Council on Trade & Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World 
Trading System?, 13, WEF REF 160414 (July 2014) http://www3.wefo-
rum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegionalTradeAgreements_Re-
port_2014.pdf [hereinafter WEF Report].  The WEF Report defines mega-UHJLRQDOVDV³GHHSLQWH
gration partnerships in the form of RTAs between countries or regions with a major share of world 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), and in which two or more of the parties are in a paramount 
GULYHUSRVLWLRQRUVHUYHDVKXEVLQJOREDOYDOXHFKDLQV´ 
the United States and Vietnam) was signed in February 2016. Given that the newly 
elected US President Donald Trump has announced his administration would re-
voke the agreement, the future of this mega-regional is uncertain.59 Likewise, the 
negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between 
the EU and the US DUHUHJDUGHGDV³IUR]HQ´DIWHUWKHHOHFWLRQRIPresident Trump,60 
as are the negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), involving ten ASEAN members, along with China, Japan, South Korea, 
India, Australia and New Zealand. The EU, the exclusive competence on trade re-
lations, which was deepened under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, has been questioned by 
these conflicts around mega-regional agreements. Given the protectionist agenda 
of the new US government¶V DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ, chances for the conclusion of new 
RTAs are also minimal for the timebeing. 
Still, the mega-regionals are not only important because of the parties involved²
including VRPHRIWKHZRUOG¶VPDMRUWUDGLQJQDWLRQV²but also because of their ex-
pansive scope, which covers not only market access but also regulatory coherence.  
Given their scope and membership, the success or failure of mega-regionals may 
influence multilateral rule development.  Success may mean future multilateral 
rules may be modelled after the mega-regionals.61  Success also may lead to fewer 
RTAs, helping to clean up the spaghetti bowl.62  However, success is not guaranteed 
because the various mega-regionals have come under significant scrutiny, triggered 
partly by civil society demands for transparency and partly by political opposition. 
Environmental provisions have become increasingly prevalent in RTAs.  
NAFTA set the stage by including a side-agreement, the North American Agree-
ment on Environmental Cooperation, with other US RTAs following suit.  The EU 
also started to incorporate environmental provisions in its RTAs with third coun-
tries since the mid-1990s.  EU trade agreements with third countries are also linked 
to an increasing number of multilateral environmental agreements, while US trade 
agreements have become increasingly specific about the environmental action re-
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deal?, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Dec. 12, 2016), , 
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61 Richard Baldwin, Multilateralising 21st Century Regionalism, in OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON 
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alism-baldwin-paper.pdf. 
62 WEF Report, supra note 58, at 26. 
quired, backed up by consultations and dispute-settlement procedures in the agree-
ments.63  The trend of including environmental provisions is continuing also in the 
negotiation of mega-regionals.  Chapter 20 of the TPP and Chapter 24 of CETA are 
dedicated in their entirety to environmental issues, and a chapter on trade and sus-
tainable development is the subject of ongoing TTIP negotiations. 
C. THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE REGIMES 
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the climate regime has witnessed 
an evolution towards a universal regime, requiring mitigation efforts from all par-
ties but leaves open what kind of action parties should or may undertake.  The shift 
towards a ³ERWWRP-XS´DSSURDFKWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOFOLPDWHSROLF\has potential im-
plications on trade because the resulting flexibility allows for a variety of measures 
that could have trade implications and for which a supportive trade policy setting 
would be helpful. 
The international trade regime also has undergone significant changes in 
recent years.  Although a well-established system of trade rules has been in place 
for over twenty years, and WTO PHPEHUVQRZLQFOXGHWKHZRUOG¶VPDMRUWUDGLQJ
nations, the single-undertaking approach that led to the WTO has created difficul-
ties.  Flanked by an increasing number of RTAs and, more recently, by new mega-
regional agreements, the relevance and dominance of the WTO in setting interna-
tional trade rules has been challenged.  ,QWXUQWKH:72¶VGRPLQDQWSRVLWLRQPD\
offer both opportunities and risks for global climate protection because there is a 
lack of guidance on the one hand, and of space for new mutually supportive rules 
on the other. 
The two regimes have so far co-existed without creating severe frictions.64  
However, this may not be the case in the future with the recent emergence of several 
climate-related disputes.  The fact that both regimes find themselves at a crossroads 
may also lead to new opportunities to create rules and procedures that lead to ben-
efits for climate change, trade, and development. 
                                                 
63 See Sikina Jinnah & Elisa Morgera, Environmental Provisions in American and EU Free Trade 
Agreements: A Preliminary Comparison and Research Agenda, 22 REV. OF EUR., COMP. & INT¶L 
ENVTL. L. (2013). Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law. 
64 See HARRO VAN ASSELT, supra note 25, at 166; Robyn Eckersley, Understanding the Interplay 
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II. TRADE PROVISIONS AND DISPUTES THAT RELATE TO CLIMATE POLICY 
There are a number of general and specific clauses and rules under the 
WTO, as well as disputes and cases, that are relevant for countries implementing 
national or international climate policy measures.  We list the key clauses and dis-
putes and highlight their relevance for future climate policy making. 
A. THE GATT RULES AND CLIMATE POLICY 
The trade rules under the WTO are based on the principles of transparency, 
predictability, and stability.65  7KH:72WUDGHUXOHV¶SXUSRVHLVWRUHGXFHWUDQVDF
tion costs for the WTO members and to provide a basis for applying trade measures 
among WTO members.  Article I of GATT sets up the MFN obligation that also 
creates a multiplier effect for bilateral talks: if one member agrees on a lower tariff 
with a trade partner, that tariff will apply automatically to all other WTO members 
such that discrimination among WTO members is avoided and requires a specific 
justification.66  Non-discrimination is key: non-discrimination is incorporated in 
Article III of GATT (the national treatment obligation), which demands imported 
SURGXFWV EH WUHDWHG RQ SDU ZLWK ³OLNH´ GRPHVWically produced goods.67  Article 
II.2(a) of GATT allows a WTO member to impose a charge either on an imported 
product that is equivalent to an internal tax that the concerned member has imposed 
on like-domestic products or on an article from which the imported product has 
been produced in whole or in part.68 However, it also needs to be ensured that such 
a border tax adjustment abides by the national treatment requirements,69 thus en-
suring imported products are not discriminated against compared to like-domestic 
products. 
Non-discrimination among WTO members, and among traded goods and 
GRPHVWLFDOO\SURGXFHG³OLNH´SURGXFWVSRVHVFKDOOHQJHVIRUFOLPDWHSROLF\PDN
ing.70 7KH³OLNHQHVV´RISURGXFWVDVXQGHUVWRRG²though not defined²under the 
WTO regime is a key element of addressing emissions through climate policy 
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66 GATT, supra note 21, art. I.  
67Id. at art. III. 
68 Id. at art. II.2(a). 
69 Id. at art. III(2). 
70 See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and 
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measures.71  Emissions are often part of the production process and cannot be found 
in the physical characteristics of a traded good (i.e. they are non-product-related 
processes and production methods, or PPMs).  Differentiation of imports or exports 
based on their non-product-related PPMs (e.g. WKHLU³HPEHGGHGFDUERQ´FRXOGEH
necessary at the border, but would need justification under the WTO rules.72  The 
legality of border carbon adjustments or carbon taxes applied to imported goods 
largely hinges on this particular point (see Part III.D). 
Articles VI and XVI of GATT provide the basic principles on subsidies and 
countervailing duties (CVD) in the GATT/WTO system, whereas the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) is an implementation agreement.  
Article XVI ³contains general provisions against subsidies that expand the exports 
of primary products or lower the export prices of other products below those pre-
YDLOLQJLQWKHGRPHVWLFPDUNHW´73  Article VI SURYLGHVIRUWKHLPSRVLWLRQRI³FRXQ
tervailing duties to offset subsidies granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufac-
WXUHSURGXFWLRQRUH[SRUWRIDQ\PHUFKDQGLVH´74  To impose a countervailing duty, 
KRZHYHU ³LQMXU\ RU WKUHDW RI LQMXU\ WR DQ HVWDEOLVKHG LQGXVWU\ PXVW EH GHWHU
mined.Alternatively, the subsidy must be shown to retard the establishment of an 
HTXLYDOHQWGRPHVWLFLQGXVWU\´75 
Article XX of GATT contains a list of exceptions to the GATT rules.  Non-
discrimination, for instance, can be suspended if certain conditions are met.  Two 
of these exceptions relate to HQYLURQPHQWDOFRQFHUQVLIGLVFULPLQDWLRQLV³QHFHV
VDU\WRSURWHFWKXPDQDQLPDORUSODQWOLIHRUKHDOWK´76 RULILWUHODWHVWR³WKHFRQ
servation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production and consumption,´77 then dis-
crimination is permissible.  For all exceptions, the conditions stipulated in the in-
troductory part (chapeau) of Article XX need to be met.  Thus, any measure has to 
SDVVWKHWHVWRI³DUELWUDU\RUXQMXVWLILDEOHGLVFULPLQDWLRQ´RUGLVJXLVHGWUDGHUHVWULF
tiveness.78  The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol also use this wording (see Part 
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I.A, above).  Article XX is a key clause for the discussion concerning how climate 
policy measures can be justified under, and supported by, the international trade 
regime because Article XX opens the way for policy measures deemed necessary 
to follow other than purely trade-centerd ambitions. 
B. OTHER WTO AGREEMENTS AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR CLIMATE-AND TRADE 
POLICY INTERACTIONS 
In addition to the GATT, another set of agreements under the WTO are rel-
evant for the interactions between climate and trade policy because they regulate 
either specific aspects of trade in goods (e.g. property rights or standards) or ser-
vices.  This part looks at the seven most important of these agreements in turn, and 
discusses their relevance for climate policy. 
1. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
Pursuant to Article I.1 of *$76WKHDJUHHPHQWDSSOLHVWRDOO³PHDVXUHVE\
0HPEHUVDIIHFWLQJWUDGHLQVHUYLFHV´FRYHULQJ³any service in any sector except 
VHUYLFHVVXSSOLHGLQWKHH[HUFLVHRIJRYHUQPHQWDODXWKRULW\´79 and extends to both 
direct and indirect effects on trade in services.80  The GATS approach to the liber-
alization of services applies positive lists (e.g., Schedules of Commitments), mean-
ing that members identify those services they want to liberalize. The MFN principle 
applies accordingly.81  
Policies adopted for climate change mitigation and adaptation that directly 
or indirectly affect trade in services are subject to scrutiny under the GATS if they 
fall within VHFWRUVRUVXEVHFWRUVWKDWDUHLQFOXGHGLQDPHPEHU¶V6FKHGXOHRI&RP
mitments.  The market for services related to climate protection is large and may 
even exceed the market for related goods.82  Because these services are spread 
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79 GATS, supra note 37, at art. I.2. 
80 See Panel report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/GTM, 
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81 GATS, supra note 37, at II.1. 
82 In the energy sector, the trade in energy is only made feasible through a series of supporting 
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Another Market-based Solution to Cope with the Tragedy of Commons?, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
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across multiple sectors, however, it becomes difficult to identify and classify them 
under the established nomenclature.83  Moreover, because services related to energy 
or clean technologies are often traded in tandem with the corresponding goods, co-
ordination between negotiations on goods and negotiations on services is necessary 
but often lacking.84 
WTO negotiations on environmental services and their classification con-
tinue at the Special Session of the Committee on Trade in Services.85  For now, 
however, each measure is assessed on a case-by-case basis, subsuming the services 
in question under established sectors and subsectors listed in the Schedules of Com-
mitments of individual members. 
Slow progress with liberalization under the GATS is shifting items to the 
agenda of negotiations on regional or plurilateral trade agreements, such as the 
Trade in Services Agreement.86  When relating to climate-relevant services, there-
fore, greater normative fragmentation and geographic heterogeneity is a likely out-
come going forward. 
2. AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT 
MEASURES 
Recognizing that certain investment measures can have trade-restrictive and 
distorting effects, the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS) prohibits the use of TRIMS that are inconsistent with Article III (national 
treatment) or Article XI (general elimination of quantitative restrictions) of GATT 
1994 in Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement.87  The Agreement applies to invest-
ment measures related to trade in goods only and does not cover trade in services, 
DQGLWVFRYHUDJHLVOLPLWHGWRWKH:72UXOHVPHQWLRQHG7KHWHUP³WUDGH-related 
LQYHVWPHQWPHDVXUHV´LVQRWGHILQHGLQWKHDJUHHPHQW +RZHYHU WKHDJUHHPHQW
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84 Id. at 1. 
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WTO Doc. JOB/SERV/84 (Aug. 31, 2011). 
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contains in an annex a non-exhaustive, illustrative list of measures that are incon-
sistent with Article III.4 or Article XI:1 of GATT 1994.  The list includes certain 
mandatory and domestically enforceable measures imposed by WTO members, 
such as local content requirements (LCRs) for the production of goods, trade-bal-
ancing requirements (e.g. limiting the purchase or use of imported products to an 
amount related to the volume or value of exported products by an enterprise), ex-
change-balancing requirements (e.g. restricting access to foreign exchange to an 
amount related to the foreign exchange inflows to the enterprise), export re-
strictions, and so on. 
The TRIMS Agreement has turned out to be one of the most cited WTO 
agreements in climate-related disputes that are dominated by cases about LCRs 
pertaining to renewable energy policies of various WTO members (see Part II.C).  
The TRIMS requirements for transparency in domestic rules and non-discrimina-
tion for investing in new energy production may clash with national employment 
and industrial policy strategies that are part of some NDCs.  Thus, it is expected 
that trade partners will continue challenging national rules that discriminate against 
importers. 
3. AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The TRIPS Agreement was created to protect intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) relating to traded products; for instance, products that can be counterfeited.  
TRIPS provides a minimum standard for domestic intellectual property laws of 
WTO members.  Before the TRIPS Agreement, there was minimal international 
enforceability of IPRs due to a lack of stringent dispute settlement.88 The TRIPS 
Agreement covers copyrights and related rights; trademarks; geographical indica-
tions; industrial designs; patents (including plant variety protection); layout designs 
(topographies) of integrated circuits; and protection of undisclosed information in-
cluding trade secrets and test data.89 
IPRs play an important role as an incentive for technology development and 
innovation but also influence the transfer and diffusion of technologies.  The ob-
jective of the TRIPS Agreement stipulates IPR protection is expected to contribute 
to both benefitting stakeholders and balancing rights and obligations.90  The agree-
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89 See TRIPS, supra note 38. 
90 Id. at art. VII. 
PHQW¶V ³SULQFLSOHV´ recognize members' rights to adopt TRIPS Agreement-con-
sistent measures to protect, inter alia, not only public health and nutrition but also 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and tech-
nological development.91  TRIPS-consistent measures may also be undertaken to 
SUHYHQWWKHDEXVHRI,35VE\ULJKWKROGHUVRU³WKHUHVRUWWRSUDFWLFHVZKLFKXQUHD
VRQDEO\UHVWUDLQWUDGHRUDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDQVIHURIWHFKQRORJ\´.92  
Currently, the TRIPS Agreement protects patents for twenty years.93 Trade secrets, 
including tacit know-how, are covered by the agreement, which obliges members 
to protect information that is secret. 94 
Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement requires developed countries to pro-
vide incentives to their enterprises and institutions for promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to least developed countries.95  The agreement allows members 
WRXQGHUWDNHPHDVXUHVE\PDNLQJXVHRIFHUWDLQ³IOH[LELOLWLHV´EXilt into the agree-
ment, such as non-voluntary or compulsory licenses, or a government use authori-
zation for a patented technology, limited exceptions for non-commercial research, 
and so on.96 As affirmed by the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health, each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.  Article 
64 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that disputes regarding IPRs be settled by the 
WTO dispute settlement process.97  Part III of the TRIPS Agreement describes a 
set of norms to enforce IPRs protection using trade-related measures, but the stand-
ards for their application need updating in the light of very dynamic trends in inter-
national IPRs issues.98 
Access to environmentally beneficial and climate-friendly technologies and 
know-how is a key driver of mitigation, and increasingly also of adaptation activi-
ties.  The TRIPS Agreement strengthens the position of developers of climate-
friendly technologies, but also demands a better dissemination via technology 
transfer.  This position is particularly important for increasing emission reductions 
quickly by transferring innovative technologies to as many countries as possible, 
without securing a minimum amount of research and development cost coverage.  
The MFN provision guarantees certain measures that facilitate technology transfer 
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towards selected countries are extended to all WTO members.  The role of the 
TRIPS Agreement, however, is still not settled given  ongoing debate on what con-
stitutes technology transfer.  Moreover, enforcement of IPRs protection via trade 
measures needs to be based on more precise common standards, and the TRIPS 
Agreement offers only rough guidance.99 
4. AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
The TBT Agreement focuses on non-discrimination and is more specific 
than the GATT provisions.100  It establishes features specific to the preparation and 
application of regulatory measures that affect the trade in goods.101  Under the TBT 
Agreement, if a regulatory measure determines product characteristics or related 
production methods with which compliance is mandatory, this is considered a tech-
nical regulation.102  Technical regulations are allowed if they are applied equally 
to domestic and imported product and do not create ³unnecessary obstacles to in-
ternational trade.´103  A document that determines rules, guidelines, or characteris-
tics of products or related production methods with which compliance is voluntary 
is a standard under the TBT Agreement.104  If a measure sets out procedures that 
require the fulfilment of technical regulations or standards (i.e., testing, inspections, 
and certification), then this falls under conformity assessment procedures under the 
TBT Agreement.105 
Following the TBT Agreement, mandatory climate regulations, such as fuel 
efficiency requirements for cars or mandatory energy labelling for products, would 
be considered technical regulations, whereas voluntary eco-labelling schemes re-
ferring to governmental standards would be considered a standard.  To this end, 
technical regulations should not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective, which includes the protection of the environment and the cli-
mate (as under Article XX GATT).  Moreover, as the TBT Agreement strongly 
favors the use of international standards, it is sensible to develop standards through 
international cooperation.106  Yet it is uncertain whether the TBT Agreement also 
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applies to non-product related PPMs.107  This means, for instance, that it is unclear 
whether the agreement applies to regulations specifying the permissible greenhouse 
gas emissions generated in the production of a good or mandatory labels indicating 
the carbon footprint of certain products. 
5. AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES 
The SCM Agreement adds precision to Article XVI of GATT by providing 
definitions of subsidies and clear disciplines on countervailing duties.  It has the 
purpose of limiting use of subsidies by WTO members and includes rules for ac-
tions against a trDGHSDUWQHU¶V VXEVLGLHV $FRXQWU\FDQFKDUJHDFRXQWHUYDLOLQJ
duty itself on subsidised imports if those are found to hurt the domestic producer.108  
The SCM Agreement defines subsidies in Article 1.1.109 With reference to Article 
XVI GATT, any form of income or price support falls under the definition of sub-
sidies.  However, the subsidy identification holds only if a benefit is conferred 
through any of the transfer options listed.  The key concept focuses RQ³VSHFLILF´
subsidies.110  Specific subsidies are available only to an enterprise, industry, group 
of enterprises, or group of industries in the subsidizing country.111  The SCM 
Agreement regulates these specific subsidies, which can be domestic or export sub-
sidies.112  The agreement defines two categories: prohibited and actionable.  Pro-
hibited subsidies are contingent upon export performance or upon the use of do-
mestic over imported goods.113  Those subsidies that fulfil the criteria of transfer-
ring a government financial contribution, being specific, and conferring a benefit 
are actionable.114  If a subsidy is not specific, it is non-actionable. 
Domestic climate policy design could contradict the SCM Agreement if 
governments support domestic producers in a protectionist manner or differentiate 
prices for fuels at the border.  In particular, the increasing interest in supporting 
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renewable energy production has led to direct and indirect subsidisation of domes-
tic goods that are also exported.  The rising number of WTO disputes (see Part II.C) 
mirrors this trend.  By contrast, the SCM Agreement has not disciplined the exten-
sive subsidization of fossil fuels in many WTO members.115  Given the pressing 
demands for reducing fossil fuel subsidies that stimulate greenhouse gas emissions, 
the WTO could play an important role in reforming national fossil fuel subsidies 
by acting as an information hub and providing guidance through the SCM rules.116 
6. ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article VI of GATT 
and provides the rulebook for WTO members to follow in their respective anti-
dumping laws and practices.117  Members can act against dumping where there is 
³JHQXLQHµmaterial¶) LQMXU\WRWKHFRPSHWLQJGRPHVWLFLQGXVWU\´118  A member has 
WRHVWDEOLVK³dumping is taking place, calculate the extent of dumping (how much 
lower the export price is comparHGWRWKHH[SRUWHU¶VKRPHPDUNHWSULFHDQGVKRZ
WKDWWKHGXPSLQJLVFDXVLQJLQMXU\RUWKUHDWHQLQJWRGRVR´119  It allows for charging 
extra import duties on the particular product from the particular exporting country 
WR³EULQJLWVSULFHFORVHUWRWKHµQRUPDOYDOXH¶RUWRUHPRYHWKHLQMXU\WRGRPHVWLF
LQGXVWU\LQWKHLPSRUWLQJFRXQWU\´120 
Anti-dumping actions have been used by WTO members in the context of 
climate-related products, and for renewable energy products in particular.121  The 
fast-growing market for solar cells and panels and the market share increase by 
Chinese producers made first movers in European solar industry struggle with the 
dynamics of international trade and specialization.122  In 2013 the EU imposed two-
year anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties against China for the protection of EU 
producers of solar panels..123  If climate policy will create more new technologies 
that follow the example of solar panels, future dynamics in the markets for climate-
                                                 
115 See Liesbeth Casier et al., Shining a Light on Fossil Fuel Subsidies at the WTO: How NGOs Can 
Contribute to WTO Notification and Surveillance, INT¶L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 19 (2014). 
116See id. at 5; HARRO VAN ASSELT, supra note 25, at 15.  
117 See WTO, Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc, https://www.wto.org/eng-




121 See generally European Commission Press Release, 7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V0HDVXUHV$JDLQVW
Dumped and Subsidised Imports of Solar Panels from China, CHAR/04/39 (Feb. 29, 2016). 
122 See generally id. 
123 Id. 
related goods may provoke more anti-dumping allegations because domestic indus-
trial policy strategies collide with trade rules. 
7. AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) aims at promoting 
transparency, integrity, and competition for government spending.  The GPA 
emerged as one of the few multilateral agreements within the WTO legal frame-
work.124  7KH³*3$KDVJDLQHGVLJQLILFDQFHRYHUWLPHEHFDXVHSURFXUHPHQWSURYL
VLRQVLQELODWHUDORUUHJLRQDOWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVDUHPRGHOOHGRQLWVVWUXFWXUHV´125 
Government purchasing is a key means to establish demand for climate-
friendly goods, such as low-emission transport or materials with a low-carbon foot-
print.  In particular, countries with an ambitious climate policy often include 
³JUHHQ´FULWHULa in their tenders.  This could lead to discrimination of imports if the 
criteria include non-product-related PPMs.  The 2012 revision of the GPA intro-
duced a new work program on the treatment of sustainable procurement.  The work 
program covers the objectives of sustainable procurement, the ways in which it is 
integrated in national and sub-national policies, and the ways in which such pro-
FXUHPHQWFDQEHPDGHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHSULQFLSOHRI³EHVWYDOXHIRUPRQH\´ 
C. WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND CLIMATE POLICY 
The trade and climate debate develops also with trade disputes and their 
settlement through case law.  Over time, exporting countries have challenged vari-
ous environmental requirements by importing countries on the grounds that they 
constitute protectionism, and that the importing country is exercising an unaccepta-
ble form of extraterritorial regulation in areas beyond its national jurisdiction.  The 
U.S. fishing standards contested in the Shrimp/Turtle126 and the Tuna/Dolphin127 
cases regulated non-product-related PPMs.  Thus, the disputes touched on the key 
question of what features determine whether traded goods (e.g., tuna, shrimp) are 
                                                 
124 Alan Herve & David Luff, Trade Law Implications of Procurement Practices 
in Sustainable Energy Goods and Services, INT¶L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 1 (2012). 
125 Marc Steiner, The WTO Government Procurement Agreement: Assessing the Scope for Green 
Procurement, INT¶L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Dec. 1, 2015). 
126 See generally Panel Report, United States ± Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WTO Doc. DS58, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2017). 
127 See generally Panel Report, United States ± Restrictions on Import of Tuna, WTO Doc. DS21/R 
 (Sept. 3, 1991); Panel Report, United States ± Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing 
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011). 
³OLNH´SURGXFWVLIWKHSURFHVVRIWKHLUSURGXFWLRQGLIIHUVZLWKUHVSHFWWRHQYLURQ
mental impacts (e.g., killing dolphins or turtles).  Negative economic effects on the 
exporting countries were also part of the discussion because ³330VFDQFUHDWHIL
QDQFLDODQGWHFKQRORJLFDOEXUGHQV´IRUGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV¶SURGXFHUV128 
Climate-related disputes are still a small proportion of the total number of 
GLVSXWHVLQLWLDWHGXQGHUWKH:72¶VGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWV\VWHP\HWWKHODWHVWFDVHV
are linked to national climate policy targets.  A growing tension is perceptible be-
tween trade rules and national renewable energy laws and policies. In addition, anti-
dumping measures have increased, involving allegations related to unfair subsidies, 
the use of LCRs, or the calculations of countervailing duties.  The Annex to this 
article lists the details of cases; here, we summarize the state of the disputes. 
Five recent disputes relating to renewable energy and LCRs: 
x Japan initiated the Canada ± Renewable Energy case in 2010 against the 
SURYLQFHRI2QWDULR¶VIHHG-in tariff (FIT) program.  The Japanese claim was 
WKHSURJUDP¶V/&5VGLVFULPLQDWHGDJDLQVWIRUHLJQUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\SURG
ucts, placed Canada in violation of national treatment requirements of the 
GATT and the TRIMS Agreement, and constituting a prohibited subsidy 
under the SCM Agreement.  Canada argued its FIT was a form of govern-
ment procurement to which the national treatment obligation did not apply, 
and the measure was designed to ensure the affordable generation of clean 
energy in Ontario.  Consequently, Canada argued the measure was not sub-
ject to the WTO agreements cited.129  The EU had separately challenged the 
same FIT program in 2011.  The WTO panels for these two cases acknowl-
edged most of the claims by Japan and the EU, including the GATT and 
TRIMS violations, but were divided on the subsidy issue. Canada appealed 
the decisions.  The Appellate Body (AB) in May 2013 held 2QWDULR¶V),7
program violated the national treatment obligation under GATT and the 
75,0VDJUHHPHQWWKRXJKLWGLVDJUHHGZLWKWKHSDQHO¶VDQDO\VLVRQDIHZ
points of law, including the subsidy determination.  As a result, Canada had 
to bring its programs into compliance, which it did by mid-2014. 
x The U.S. raised a second case on renewable energy, China ± Measures Con-
cerning Wind Power EquipmentLQDJDLQVW&KLQD¶V6SHFLDO)XQGIRU
Wind Power Equipment Manufacturing.  It offered subsidies to Chinese 
wind turbine manufacturers that agreed to use key parts and components 
                                                 
128 See Rafael Leal-Arcas, Unilateral Trade-related Climate Change Measures, 13 THE J. OF WORLD 
INV. & TRADE 875, 889 (2012). 
129 See Joanna I. Lewis, The Rise of Renewable Energy Protectionism: Emerging Trade Conflicts 
and Implications for Low Carbon Development, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 10, 19 (2014). 
made in China rather than imported parts.  This case was chosen out of mul-
WLSOH86LQYHVWLJDWLRQVRQ&KLQD¶VUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\SUDFWLFHVLQFOXGLQJ
a series of anti-dumping and CVD investigations.130  The consultations that 
followed led to a revocation of the subsidy in 2011 by China.131 
x In a parallel cases, China launched United States ± Countervailing Duty 
Measures on Certain Products from China in May 2012 against several 
U.S. CVD investigations, which, among other things, addressed pricing of 
Chinese solar panels and wind towers.132  U.S. lobby groups alleged Chi-
nese companies received unfair government support, leading to sales at be-
low-market prices.133  In July 2014, a WTO panel found the U.S. practices 
on the calculation of CVDs to be in violation of certain provisions of the 
SCM and recommended the U.S. government bring its measures into con-
formity.  As both China and the U.S. filed appeals on certain legal questions, 
the appellate body (AB) had to take up the case.  Its report was adopted with 
recommendations to bring the U.S. measures into conformity with WTO 
law.  While the U.S. was reportedly implementing the DSB recommenda-
tions, China notified the WTO it was requesting consultations with the 
United States over the alleged non-compliance with the recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB.134 
x In 2012, China launched the fourth dispute referring to LCRs, European 
Union and certain Member States ± Certain Measures Affecting the Renew-
able Energy Generation Sector. China requested WTO consultations with 
the EU, Greece, and Italy on various FIT programs in support of solar en-
ergy generation that allegedly contained LCRs. China claimed that the 
                                                 
130 6HHJHQHUDOO\8QLWHG6WHHOZRUNHU¶V6HFWLRQ3HWLWLRQ'HPRQVWUDWHV&KLQD¶V*UHHQ7HFKQRO
ogy Practices Violate WTO Rules, UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://assets.usw.org/releases/misc/sec-
tion-301.pdf ODVWYLVLWHG)HE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RXWOLQLQJ&KLQD¶VSUDFWLFHVLQYLRODWLRQRI:72SROLFLHV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131 See generally US Proclaims Victory in Wind Power Case; China Ends Challenged Subsidies, 
INT¶L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 8, 2011), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/bridges/news/us-proclaims-victory-in-wind-power-case-china-ends-challenged-subsidies. 
132 See US Probe into China, Vietnam Wind Tower Imports Moves Forward, INT¶L CTR. FOR TRADE 
& SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/us-probe-
into-china-vietnam-wind-tower-imports-moves-forward. 
133 See US-China Renewable Energy Row Escalates with Solar Duty Announcement, INT¶L CTR. FOR 
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (May 23, 2012), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/us-
china-renewable-energy-row-escalates-with-solar-duty-announcement. 
134 China requests consultations with US, WTO: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (May 13, 2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/ds437oth_13may16_e.htm.; see Statement by the 
United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (Apr. 22, 2016), https://geneva.us-
mission.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Feb20.DSB_.Stmt_.pdf. 
measures were inconsistent with the GATT, SCM, and TRIMS agreements. 
The EU accepted the request for consultations,135 which are still pending. 
x The U.S. initiated the fifth WTO dispute, India ± Certain Measures Relating 
to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, in February 2013 against Indian LCR 
provisions pertaining to solar cells and/or modules. Under the Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM), New Delhi aims at generating 
100,000 mega-watts (MW) of grid-connected solar power capacity by 
2022.136 The U.S. complained WKH/&5VZHUHLQYLRODWLRQRI,QGLD¶VREOLJD
tions under the GATT, TRIMS, and SCM agreements. The WTO estab-
lished a panel in May 2014 to hear the case. India tried to persuade the U.S. 
to withdraw the case for several months through bilateral discussions. In its 
February 2016 report , the panel found WKH -1160¶V /&5V FRQVWLWXWHG
trade-related investment measures, thus violating the national treatment ob-
ligation under the TRIMS agreement and the GATT. Moreover, the 
PHDVXUHVFRXOGQRWEHH[HPSWHGE\WKH*$77¶VJRYHUQPHQWSURFXUHPHQW
GHURJDWLRQQRUFRXOGWKH\EHMXVWLILHGE\WKDWDJUHHPHQW¶VJHQHUDOH[FHS
tions under Article XX(d), because WKHSDQHOUHJDUGHGWKHPDVQHLWKHU³HV
VHQWLDO´QRU³QHFHVVDU\´137 The panel also emphasized its analysis was of 
the WTO legality of the LCRs and the legitimacy of the policy objectives 
pursued through the JNNSM was not under dispute.138 In April, 2016, India 
appealed the case, but the AB ruled against India in September, 2016.139 
                                                 
135 European Commission, General Overview of Active WTO Dispute Settlement Cases Involving 
the EU as Complainant or Defendant and of Active Cases under the Trade Barriers Regulation, 
European Commission, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154243.pdf, 
(last visited May 12, 2016). 
136 Indian Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Resolution, Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar 
Mission, No.5/14/2008-P&C (Jan. 11, 2010), www.mnre.gov.in/solar-mission/jnnsm/resolution-2/; 
Indian Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (July 
23, 2015), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=123607. 
137 India Lodges WTO Appeal in US Solar Cells Dispute, INT¶L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. (Apr. 28, 2016), www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/india-lodges-wto-appeal-in-us-so-
lar-cells-dispute.  
138 See WTO Decision on Local Content Requirements Will Not Affect India Solar Ambitions, INT¶L 
CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bio-
res/news/wto-decision-on-local-content-requirements-will-not-affect-india-solar. 
139 WTO: Dispute Settlement, India-Solar Cells ± Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and 
Solar Modules, WTO Doc. DS456, https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm. (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). 
x Meanwhile, India has lodged a WTO challenge against alleged LCRs and 
subsidies that eight U.S. states have imposed.140 
 
Another contested trade-related issue is biofuels. Argentina and Indonesia 
together filed four WTO disputes regarding biodiesel anti-dumping duties imposed 
E\WKH(8QRWDEO\$UJHQWLQDDQG,QGRQHVLDFRPELQHGPDNHXSRIWKH(8¶V
biodiesel imports and capture over one-fifth of the market share).141 The main fea-
tures of the four cases include the favoring of biodiesels produced in the EU by 
Spain; certain measures on importing and marketing of biodiesel; the support of the 
biodiesel industry in Belgium, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain; and anti-dumping 
measures within the EU. When challenging the EU policy under WTO law, Argen-
tina and Indonesia referred to the Agreement Establishing the WTO and the GATT, 
TBT, TRIMS, Anti-Dumping, and SCM agreements. Whereas the dispute on the 
favoring of biodiesels produced in the EU by Spain was put on hold after Spain 
announced it would modify the biofuel rule, the panel report in the dispute on anti-
dumping measures was published and is currently under review by the AB.142 In 
the second dispute on anti-dumping measures, filed by Indonesia, the panel report 
is still pending. The dispute on the importation and marketing of biodiesel has not 
reached the panel stage (see Annex for further details). 
D. REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CLIMATE PROVISIONS 
Relevant rules on the climate-trade interface can also be found in RTAs. 
Three types of environmental and climate provisions exist.143 A first type is general 
environmental provisions that do not mention climate change, but are nevertheless 
applicable. They include references to the environment, references to principles of 
particular relevance to addressing climate change (e.g., the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities), provisions stipulating parties need to ensure a 
                                                 
140  WTO: Dispute Settlement, United States-Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy 
Sector, WTO Doc. DS510, https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds510_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).  
141 WTO Panel to Examine EU Duties on Argentine Biodiesel, INT¶L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINA-
BLE DEV. (May 1, 2014), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/wto-panel-to-examine-
eu-duties-on-argentine-biodiesel.  
142 EU, Argentina File Appeals in Biodiesel WTO Dispute, INT¶L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. (June 2, 2016), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/eu-argentina-file-appeals-in-
biodiesel-wto-dispute. 
143 See Markus W. Gehring et al., Climate Change and Sustainable Energy in Regional Trade Agree-
ments (RTAs): An Overview, INT¶L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Aug. 
2013), http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/08/climate-change-and-sustainable-energy-measures-
in-regional-trade-agreements-rtas.pdf. 
high level of environmental protection, or instructing parties to uphold, improve, 
and enforce environmental laws. In addition, to the extent that references to multi-
lateral environmental agreements are not specified (e.g., by listing them), any ref-
erence that specifies the relationship between an RTA and such agreements could 
also be seen to include the climate treaties (UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agree-
ment). The general environmental provisions also include specifications of the ex-
ception of Article XX of the GATT, with some RTAs extending the exception to 
other issue areas, such as technical barriers to trade. 
A second type of provision explicitly aims at promoting or facilitating trade 
and investment in climate-relevant sectors. This includes provisions, among others, 
that specifically encourage the liberalization of trade in climate-friendly goods and 
services, provisions that could be aimed at removing non-tariff barriers (e.g. 
through harmonization of standards), and provisions that regulate energy subsidies. 
Several RTAs include provisions in which parties state their intentions to liberalize 
trade in environmental goods and services; including, for example, goods or ser-
vices related to renewable energy. 
The EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Article 13.11.2144 is a recent ex-
ample of this second type of agreement seeking to facilitate the trade in climate-
friendly goods and services. In addition, Article 7.4(a) of the Agreement is dedi-
cated to non-tariff barriers to trade and investment in renewable energy generation, 
in which it is specified SDUWLHVZLOO³UHIrain from adopting measures providing for 
ORFDOFRQWHQWUHTXLUHPHQWVRUDQ\RWKHURIIVHWDIIHFWLQJWKHRWKHU3DUW\¶VSURGXFWV
VHUYLFHVXSSOLHUVLQYHVWRUVRULQYHVWPHQWV´145 The same agreement also includes 
a provision on considering greenhouse gas emissions as reducing trade distortions 
from fossil fuel subsidies, stating ³WKH3DUWLHVVKDUHWKHJRDORISURJUHVVLYHO\UHGXF
LQJVXEVLGLHVIRUIRVVLOIXHOV´FRQWDLQHGLQ$UWLFOH146 
A third type of provision, which can be found in many different RTAs, is 
aimed at deepening cooperation on climate change between the parties to the agree-
ment. Such provisions include general commitments to enhance climate policy ef-
forts and reaffirmations of existing commitments under the climate treaties. Also, 
provisions exist on a range of specific issues, including adaptation, carbon markets, 
technologies, forests, and agriculture. Depending on the mandate and, most im-
portantly, budget allocations by the parties involved, such provisions can form the 
                                                 
144 EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, EUR. COMM¶N art. 13.11.2 (June 29, 2015), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961.  
145 Id. at art. 7.4(a). 
146 Id. at art. 7.1. 
basis for subsequent technical cooperation, information exchange, and capacity 
building, and could even go beyond the commitments under the UNFCCC.147 
III. CLIMATE POLICY AND TRADE RULES: IDENTIFYING THE UPCOMING IS-
SUES 
Following the Paris Agreement, the climate regime is intended to progress 
through the coordination of national action, its review, and adjustment over time. 
Climate policy decisions (e.g., targets, timelines, measures) are left with the parties 
to the Paris Agreement for the time being, with the agreement asking them to sub-
mit NDCs on a regular basis in the future. As Droege H[SRXQGHG³>D@PRQJ WKH
many issues that require follow-up under the Paris Agreement, cooperation at the 
international level is planned with regard to the design of market and non-market 
mechanisms, finance, technology transfer, and the review and adjustment of 
1'&V´148 Furthermore, no mandate was agreed on the international regulation of 
aviation and maritime transport. In this Part, we first look into international climate 
action inside and outside the auspices of the Paris Agreement regime (focusing on 
cooperative approaches, technology transfer, and sectoral policies for aviation and 
maritime transport), and then into national climate policy measures (focusing on 
carbon pricing and subsidies), with the goal of discussing the role of trade rules in 
promoting climate protection. 
A. COOPERATIVE APPROACHES 
The Kyoto Protocol introduced market-based, flexible mechanisms for its 
parties to help them deliver emission reductions in an economically efficient way 
through international emissions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI). The Paris Agreement has broadened the 
scope for using such mechanisms on a voluntary basis. However, it has left the 
design and implementation of these mechanisms unfinished, causing uncertainty 
about the future of the CDM, the new mechanisms, and the future rules on verifying 
and trading of yet-to-be defined emission rights under the UNFCCC from 2020 
onwards. Given that roughly half of all INDCs submitted to date are ³FRQGLWLRQDO
                                                 
147 See Peru-Korea Free Trade Agreement, FOREIGN TRADE INFO. SYS., at § 19.8.2 (signed Nov. 14, 
2010),  
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/PER_KOR/PER_KOR_Texts_e/PER_KOR_ToC_e.
asp (example of mutual commitment).  
148 Susanne Droege et al., The trade system and climate action: ways forward under the Paris Agree-
ment, at 57 (Climate Strategies, Working Paper, Oct. 2016), http://climatestrategies.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/10/Trade-and-climate-ways-forward-1.pdf. 
XSRQKDYLQJ DFFHVV WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO FDUERQPDUNHWV´149 the importance of these 
provisions cannot be overstated, and despite the political divisions surrounding the 
concept of markets in the climate negotiations, parties expressly acknowledge the 
³LPSRUWDQWUROHRIWRROVVXFKDVFDUERQSULFLQJ´150  
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement identifies various concepts for voluntary 
cooperative approaches to climate change mitigation.151 Two of these are relevant 
for future climate-trade interactions because they enable the emergence of markets 
in carbon units across national jurisdictions. Such approaches would not have to 
operate under rules developed under the Paris Agreement, but could be based en-
tirely on domestic or regional market arcKLWHFWXUHV7KH.\RWR3URWRFRO¶VIOH[LEOH
mechanisms (e.g., international emissions trading, CDM, JI) are not explicitly men-
tioned; Article 6.1 merely recognizes voluntary cooperative approaches as a means 
to implement NDCs, and all types of policy tools could fall under this declaratory 
provision.152 Articles 6.2 and 6.3 establish that cooperative approaches can result 
LQ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\WUDQVIHUUHGPLWLJDWLRQRXWFRPHV´153 Some elementary principles 
are set out in Articles 6.1 and 6.2, such as the need to ensure environmental integrity 
and transparency, robust accounting, and the avoidance of double counting.154 
*XLGDQFHLVWREH³Ddopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
RIWKH3DUWLHVWRWKH3DULV$JUHHPHQW´ 155 It is widely expected such guidance will 
be limited to the creation of an accounting and transparency framework, while ma-
terial criteria for the nature and stringency of carbon units will be defined at the 
domestic level.156 
$UWLFOH  HVWDEOLVKHV D ³PHFKDQLVP WR FRQWULEXWH WR WKH PLWLJDWLRQ RI
JUHHQKRXVH JDV HPLVVLRQV DQG VXSSRUW VXVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSPHQW´157 (labelled by 
VRPHDV³VXVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSPHQWPHFKDQLVP´7KHQHJRWLDWLQJKLVWRU\LQGLFDWHV
this mechanism would bear resemblance to a baseline-and-credit system, such as 
                                                 
149 Environmental Defense Fund & the International Emissions Trading Association, Carbon Pric-
ing 7KH 3DULV $JUHHPHQW¶V .H\ ,QJUHGLHQW, INT¶L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS¶N, 1, 4 (2016), 
http://www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/Reports/Carbon_Pricing_The_Paris_Agree-
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150 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, supra note 28, at at ¶ 
136.  
151 Paris Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 6. 
152 Id. at art. 6.1.  
153 Id. at arts. 6.2, 6.3 .  
154 Id. at  arts. 6.1, 6.2. 
155 Id. at art. 4.11. 
156 See Christof Arens ed., The Dawning of a New Era, CARBON MECHANISMS REV., Issue 1 (2016).  
157 Paris Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 6.4.  
the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol.158 Unlike the broader scope of cooperative ap-
proaches (i.e., Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the Paris Agreement), the operation of a sus-
tainable development mechanism would be subject to material and procedural con-
trol of the CMA, supervised by a body yet to be designated.159 Also, Article 6 opens 
the way for specific coalitions among countries who use emissions trading and who 
consider coordinating actions and rules, or even linking their systems.160 
International trade in emission units is not an area of concern that has 
evolved under WTO or RTA rules, but was introduced with the Kyoto Protocol and 
subsequent rules under the UNFCCC. There are different views on whether emis-
sions units would constitute goods under the GATT, or services under the GATS, 
while most commentators conclude that they are neither.161 By contrast, in-depth 
analyses are available for how regulations of national or supranational emissions 
trading systems, such as the inclusion of importers or free allocation rules, could 
contradict trade rules (see Part III.E). Greater agreement exists that services pro-
vided in the context of markets for different tradable climate-related units, for in-
stance, greenhouse gas emission allowances, offset credits, or renewable energy 
and energy efficiency certificates in energy markets, fall under the GATS.162 These 
markets have seen robust growth, including a rise in the number of intermediaries 
(e.g., banks, brokers, exchanges, insurances, project developers, data providers, and 
verifiers). Some scholars disagree as to whether these services are covered by the 
GATS, and more specifically its Annex on Financial Services.163 Driven by the 
private sector, some primary markets for units have also given rise to secondary 
markets for derivative products, which expressly fall within the scope of the Annex 
on Financial Services. While some variability exists between individual Schedules 
                                                 
158 See See Andrei Marcu, CTR. FOR EUR. POL¶Y STUD., Carbon Market Provisions in the Paris 
Agreement, 1, 13 (2016), http://www.ceps-ech.eu/sites/de-
fault/files/SR%20No%20128%20ACM%20Post%20COP21%20Analysis%20of%20Arti-
cle%206.pdf. 
159 Paris Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 6.1, 6.3. 
160 Id. at art. 6; see also Arens, supra note 159, at 26±27. 
161 See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy et al., Beyond Kyoto: Advancing the International Effort Against Cli-
mate Change PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (2003); N. Keohane,  A. Petsonk & A. 
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162 See James Munro, Trade in Carbon Units as a Financial Service under International Trade Law, 
2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 107 (1014); Marisa Martin, Trade Law Implications of Restricting 
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(2007); Glenn M. Wiser, The Clean Development Mechanism Versus the WTO, 11 GEO. INT¶L EN-
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163 See James Munro, supra note 165 (providing an overview of the continuing debate).  
of Commitments,164 a majority of members will have committed to exercise non-
discrimination subject to MFN, market access, and national treatment principles. 
New issues could arise if emissions trading or carbon pricing coalitions165 
emerged with rules that discriminate among WTO members; for instance, by ex-
cluding trade with non-parties or with parties based on the strength of respective 
emissions trading schemes (i.e., their environmental integrity). This has already 
been the case with the restricted fungibility of certain Kyoto Protocol units in the 
EU emissions trading system (ETS) based on their geographic origin (EU, 2009, 
Article 11a.4).166 If these issues were to arise, cooperative approaches could poten-
tially come under the ambit of the trade regime if the entire rationale is premised 
on the ability to exclude non-members from a club benefit.167 
B. TRANSFER OF CLIMATE-FRIENDLY TECHNOLOGIES 
The need for technology transfer has been recognized in the UNFCCC (Ar-
ticle 4.5) and in the Paris Agreement (Article 10). The Paris Agreement emphasizes 
the means of implementation (e.g., finance, technology, and capacity building) 
must be provided by the industrialized countries to developing countries. However, 
the agreement does not prescribe how the transfer of climate-friendly technologies 
should be conducted, or how IPRs should be handled.168 This oversight is left to 
                                                 
164 Over 100 members have entered commitments on financial services, and many apply an optional 
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165 See generally CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP COAL.., Leadership Coalition, http://www.car-
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168 See generally Padmashree G. Sampath & Pedro Roffe, Unpacking the International Technology 
Transfer Debate: Fifty Years and Beyond ,QW¶O&WU for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Working Paper 
ISSN 1684-9825, 2012) (explaining the history of the protection of IPRs). 
further negotiations under the auspices of the Paris Agreement and the WTO (in-
cluding the TRIPS Agreement). Although 2010 UNFCCC talks in Cancún estab-
lished a Technology Mechanism, the thorny issue of IPRs remains unaddressed.169 
Sustained disagreement exists between developed and developing countries 
that are parties to the UNFCCC on the conceptualization of technology, its transfer 
process, and the effects from strong intellectual property protection. 170 Proponents 
of strong intellectual property protection argue IPRs foster technology transfer by 
supporting the formation of contracts.171 However, as Ockwell and others opined, 
transnational companies are unlikely to deploy cutting-edge technologies they have 
spent significant resources on in those countries where they cannot ensure adequate 
IPR protection.172 Availability (and enforceability) of IPRs likely will not create a 
sufficient incentive for the transfer of technology. Rather, IPRs could make access 
to technologies more problematic by, for example, enabling the intellectual prop-
erty right holder to keep prices prohibitively high.173 
,QDGGLWLRQWKHYDULDQFHLQGHILQLWLRQVRI³WHFKQRORJ\´DIIHFWWKHDSSOLFD
bility of trade rules. Contrastingly, technology transfer is best compared with the 
sale of a product because it includes capital-embodied technologies.174 Technology 
is not sold in its embodied form alone, nor is it fully codifiable..175 Rather, it has 
tacit elements that are difficult or impossible to transfer in written forms.176 Instead, 
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tries: A Framework with Examples from East Asia, 26 WORLD DEV. 1369, 1372 (1998).  
176 Jon Philipps et al, Governance and Technology Transfer in the Clean Development Mechanism 
in India, 23(6) GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 1594, 1595 (2013). 
for transfers to be successful, technology must include learning via capability build-
ing.177 From this perspective, the intention of the importing party matters when ad-
dressing IPR protection: transfers enabling local competition against foreign sup-
pliers will likely draw more attention to IPR issues than if the buyer does not as-
similate the technology. Firms holding IPRs are more likely to apply rights to pro-
hibit access if there is assimilation and that leads to increased competition.178 
The TRIPS Agreement plays an important role when countries discuss the 
future handling of IPRs for traded climate-friendly technologies.179 The TRIPS 
Agreement provides countries and firms with flexibility on how to protect their 
IPRs, as well as affords special treatment for the least developed countries.180 How-
ever, it does not resolve disputes over the strength and enforcement of IPRs or pro-
vide a uniform definition of technologies. Considering international trends that 
have emerged over the last twenty years, strengthening IPRs under the TRIPS 
Agreement will need to be addressed to help quell economic concerns.181 
In 2010, the WTO published an overview for policy makers, identifying the 
relevant standards of the TRIPS Agreement for climate negotiations. 182 Patents are 
the most important IPR issue within the climate context, but the WTO addresses 
other IPR tools as well (e.g., trademarks, plant variety rights, certification 
marks).183 Additionally, joining the debate in the 2011 WTO CTE, China and India 
made a joint submission²both underscoring that IPRs must not become a barrier 
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to the transfer of environmentally sound technologies.184 In 2013, Ecuador also 
made a similar claim in a TRIPS Council submission, joining the ranks of countries 
seeking to combat climate change.185 
C. GLOBAL SECTORAL POLICIES: AVIATION AND MARITIME TRANSPORT 
The most prominent unresolved global mitigation challenges arise from avi-
ation and shipping activities. The emission sources, airplanes and marine vessels, 
provide cross-border services and partly operate in international spaces beyond the 
sovereign territory of individual states. Given the unique territorial and jurisdic-
tional operations, the climate regime has largely excluded aviation and maritime 
shipping. They were subject to UNFCCC negotiations, but the Paris Agreement 
does not mention these international emission sources. The Kyoto Protocol, on the 
contrary, expressly stated in its Article 2.2 that any relevant action on emissions 
from international aviation and marine bunker fuels should occur through the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO).186 After the slow pace of international negotiations and contin-
ued rapid growth of aviation and shipping emissions, the EU announced it would 
include international aviation in its emissions trading system from 2012 onwards.187 
This unilateral action against globally operating sectors led to significant ten-
sions188 and the EU subsequently suspended its measure under intense international 
pressure. This move helped revive negotiations under the ICAO and the IMO.189 
These organizations struggle with discord about the necessity, design, and eco-
nomic consequences of measures to limit aviation and shipping emissions, strong 
pressure from industry groups, as well as asymmetrical interests of coalitions of 
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Protection Committee respectively; the 39th Session of the ICAO Assembly in September/October 
2016 is expected to result in adoption of a market-based measure to limit aviation emissions). 
states (including disagreement about applying differential treatment to developing 
countries). 
The role of the trade regime is limited as well. The GATS Agreement offers 
only little guidance in two annexes on air and maritime transport services.190 Under 
WKH³$QQH[RQ$LU7UDQVSRUW6HUYLFHV,´ aviation generally is excluded from the 
substantive scope of the GATS (exceptions are aircraft repair, maintenance ser-
vices, selling and marketing of air transport services, and computer reservation sys-
tem services).191 )RUVKLSSLQJWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJ³$QQH[RQ1HJRWLDWLRQVRQ0DU
LWLPH7UDQVSRUW6HUYLFHV´VWDtes MFN treatment only applies following the conclu-
sion of additional negotiations on maritime transport services within the WTO.192 
However, under the of 28 June 1996 decision, the Council for Trade in Services 
suspended the maritime transport negotiations until the commencement of the next 
comprehensive round of services negotiations, 193 which are still ongoing. 
At its 39th Session in September and October 2016, the ICAO Assembly adopted 
an international market-based measure to limit aviation emissions, designated a 
³&DUERQ 2IIVHWWLQJ DQG 5HGXFWLRQ 6FKHPH IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $YLDWLRQ´ &25
SIA).194 Under this scheme, any growth in CO2 emissions from international avia-
tion above 2020 levels will have to be compensated through the purchase and sur-
render of offset credits. During an initial pilot phase from 2021 to 2023 and the first 
implementation phase from 2024 to 2026, the scheme will apply only to airlines 
from states voluntarily opting to participate in CORSIA; starting with the second 
phase from 2027 to 2035, however, all states will be covered, except certain least 
developed countries and small island developing nations. The ICAO scheme COR-
SIA will not supersede any existing treaty-based trade commitments between ICAO 
members under the legal principle of lex posterior derogat legi priori.  Still, the 
                                                 
190 WTO, The General Agreement on Trade in Services: An Introduction, (Jan. 31, 2013), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gsintr_e.pdf. 
191 Id. at 4. 
192 WTO, Annex on negotiations on maritime transport services, https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/serv_e/11-anmar_e.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2017). 
193Decision on Maritime Transport Services, WTO Doc. S/L/24 (July 3,1996). 
194 International Civil Aviation Organization, Environmental protection ± International Aviation 
and Climate Change ± Policy, Standardization and Implementation Support, A39-WP/462 (2016), 
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/Documents/WP/wp_462_en.pdf. For general discussion, see 
generally Alejandro Piera, Compliance Tools for a Global Market Based Measure for Aviation. 
Designing the Legal Form of a Global Aviation Market Based Measure, 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. 
REV. (2016). 
outcome and consensus it reflects can have a significant bearing on the interpreta-
tion of Article XX GATT when defending trade-restrictive climate measures, espe-
cially where these apply to the transport sector and international spaces. 
 
D. INDCS: ARE THERE POLICY MEASURES WITH TRADE IMPLICATIONS? 
 
In 2015, 188 parties to the UNFCCC submitted their INDCs. The INDCs 
are diverse and do not follow a particular formula. Countries were free to announce 
their climate policy targets, measures, or conditionalities, such as financial de-
mands for adaptation and mitigation. Trade implications from INDCs arise for all 
measures that tax, subsidize, or regulate national economic activities, which relate 
GLUHFWO\RULQGLUHFWO\WRRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWUDGH$VWKH:72GLVSXWHV
(see Part II.C) demonstrate, national energy policy measures increasingly cause 
concerns about unfair competition. Local content requirements or other standards, 
as well as anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties, can be in conflict with 
trade law. These requirements are used in national legislations (e.g., programs to 
foster the provision of renewable technologies and production), and are rooted in 
national approaches to industrial policy making. 
In 92 out of 162 INDCs,195 the intention of using international market mech-
anisms is indicated, while 45 do not mention this tool at all.196 Mostly low-income 
countries intend to sell some type of mitigation unit to source carbon finance flows 
± provided such a trading option materializes under Article 6 of the Paris Agree-
ment. However, there currently is only a small number of countries willing to buy 
such units (e.g., Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey). Some countries express their 
interest in using international market mechanisms in the future (29), while others 
explicitly reject them (18).197 The INDCs so far reveal many countries intend to 
address emissions through investment in renewable energy. Some countries lay out 
detailed policy intentions. Most parties have announced relative or absolute targets 
                                                 
195 See generally, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, INDCs as communi-
cated by Parties, http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submis-
sions.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2017) (The EU INDC consists of one submission comprising 28 EU 
Member States, even though the total number of parties that have submitted INDCs by Jun. 2016 
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(e.g., India: wind power installation of 60GW, solar power of 100 GW by 2022; 
China: increasing the share of non-fossil fuels to 15% of energy consumption by 
2020 and to 20% by 2030; EU: 40% greenhouse gas emission reductions until 2030, 
no details on energy targets).198 
Given the high profile of the NDCs in the Paris Agreement, the national approaches 
could be increasingly exposed to scrutiny by trade partners, but will also set the 
stage for international exchange on policy practice. In this context, the absence of 
guidance regarding how the Paris Agreement implementation relates to the trade 
regime could become a critical issue in the future, and this could lead to a high 
profile of the forum on the impacts of the implementation of response measures 
(see Part I.A). 
E. NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CARBON PRICING: EMISSIONS TRADING AND CAR-
BON TAXES 
The debate on the trade implications of national climate policy started with 
the Kyoto Protocol and carbon pricing in industrialized countries.199 From a climate 
economics perspective, there are two basic ways to foster mitigation. First, domes-
tic policy can focus on supporting clean technologies; for example, renewable en-
ergy production. Market stimulation via increased returns on investment and reduc-
tion in non-market barriers will help foster major technological breakthroughs. Sec-
ondly, governments can introduce policies that raise costs for producers who emit 
carbon dioxide. For example, governments can use an explicit carbon price²like a 
carbon tax or a greenhouse gas emissions trading system, or they can use implicit 
technology regulation²as performance standards. Carbon dioxide producers can 
curb increased costs by creating a cost pass-through to customers, investing in 
cleaner technologies, or decreasing production. A carbon producer competing 
against producers located in countries with little or no climate policy tools²all 
other things equal²are at a competitive disadvantage.200 Thus, illustrating how in-
effective unilateral carbon pricing or regulation may be amongst competitors. 
Therefore, if domestic demand shifts to cheaper imported products, then production 
                                                 
198 See generally Su Wei, (QKDQFHG$FWLRQV2Q&OLPDWH&KDQJH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199 See, Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns, supra note 70, at 2; 
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abroad increases and causes more emissions, offsetting the domestic mitigation in 
RWKHUFRXQWULHVDOVRNQRZQDV³FDUERQOHDNDJH´ 
To avoid carbon leakage, both at the border measures and behind the border, 
measures are available.201 For example, if imported goods fell under the importing 
FRXQWULHV¶FDUERQSULFLQJSROLF\i.e., tax or emissions allowances coverage), the 
carbon leakage effect is reduced at the border. Policies implemented in this manner 
are referred to as border carbon adjustments (BSA). BCAs can work in two ways²
pricing imports and reimbursing exports²and resemble border tax adjustments, 
which commonly are applicable under consumption taxes (such as value added tax). 
Additionally, a BCA could include rebates to exporters, helping alleviate disad-
vantages in international markets.202 The introduction of a BCA measure has been 
explored in the EU203 and in the US (in the unsuccessful American Clean Energy 
and Security Act of 2010, as well as in the proposed American Opportunity Carbon 
Fee Act of 2014).204 Next, for companies who compete internationally, a behind-
the-border policy could include tax exemptions or other payments to help alleviate 
increased costs. However, under an emission trading systems, allocation of emis-
sion certificates²based on output (past or current)²would also provide an avenue 
to ease the cost of purchasing allowances. 
Two basic designs exist for developing BCA measures. One option is to 
establish a BCA aligned with the requirements under Article III205 for domestic 
policy tools (following several criteria under Article II.2(a) of GATT, which apply 
to a legal border tax adjustment206). A second option is to design a BCA in such a 
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way that it passes the tests of Article XX GATT207 and qualifies for an exception.208 
The design choice is key for creating BCA measures that are consistent with WTO 
rules. Because considerable uncertainty of WTO jurisprudence exists209 and intro-
duction of BCAs will compound legality questions, implementing these types of 
measures is less desirable.210  The environmental purpose of a measure that violates 
the non-discrimination obligations has to be clearly established through its design 
and practical implementation.211  Most importantly, it must not serve the protection 
of domestic industries.212  Thus, a BCA, at the very least, has to refer to the carbon 
content of a traded good and it has to target carbon leakage reduction. 
The free allocation of allowances to companies and the indirect or direct 
payments to compensate for carbon costs could be problematic from a trade policy 
point of view, too, especially if such allowances tend to overcompensate the actual 
cost impact.  If allowances tend to overcompensate, then the policy may result in 
subsidisation and could be challenged under WTO rules (notably the SCM Agree-
ment).213 While this situation is speculative, it has a strong link to the disputes over 
subsidies for renewable energy. 
F. ENERGY SUBSIDIES 
Subsidies play an important role in implementing the Paris Agreement 
through NDCs for two reasons: 1) subsidies are applied to foster renewable energy 
investments and production; and 2) existing subsidies for fossil fuels provide in-
centives for the production and consumption of carbon-intensive fuels.  Subsidies 
for the production and consumption of both low- and high-carbon energy can serve 
a variety of non-climate policy objectives, such as protecting or building up indus-
trial sectors to secure or promote employment, poverty alleviation, and increasing 
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the security of energy supply.  These objectives can collide with trade rules.214  De-
pending on the scope, design, and application of subsidies, unintended adverse so-
cio-economic and environmental effects can be significant.  For instance, the Inter-
national Energy Agency suggests consumption subsidies were responsible for 13% 
of global carbon dioxide emissions in 2014 (equivalent to a subsidy of US $115 per 
tonne of carbon dioxide).215 
The general relationship between the WTO and energy is not straightfor-
ward: the complex characteristics of energy and energy markets distinguishes en-
ergy from other traded goods regulated by the international trading system.  Energy 
can be both a good or a service, meaning it is governed by different WTO rules 
simultaneously, including, but not limited to, the SCM Agreement. 
Although trade disputes have focused largely on renewable energy subsidies 
(see Part II.C), such rules in theory also apply to fossil fuel subsidies.  Subsidies 
contingent upon export performance or upon the use of domestic over imported 
goods are prohibited under WTO law; however, other subsidies deemed ³VSHFLILF´
(i.e., aimed at certain enterprises or industries) and lead to adverse effects for other 
members are actionable, meaning they are subject to a challenge.216  Furthermore, 
the SCM Agreement specifies WTO members should notify their subsidies, provid-
ing sufficient details to allow other members to assess the impacts on trade.217  Ap-
plying these rules in practice, however, has proven difficult.  In contrast to renew-
able energy support, no fossil fuel subsidy has ever been challenged by a WTO 
member before the WTO dispute settlement system.218  For consumer subsidies, a 
key challenge is to prove VXFKVXEVLGLHVDUH³VSHFLILF,´ given that the benefits of 
such subsidies generally accrue to a broad group of producers, consumers, or 
both.219  More importantly, however, notification rates of subsidies have generally 
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been low due to a lack of commitment (possibly due to fear of starting a trade dis-
pute), lack of clarity about which subsidies need to be reported, and the inherent 
difficulties of estimating them.220  Even if WTO members do report subsidies, the 
surveillance mechanism rarely leads to the questioning of the subsidies.221 
IV. SOLUTIONS: HOW THE TRADE REGIME COULD SUPPORT CLIMATE AC-
TION 
There are many suggestions regarding to find sustainable solutions to reduce 
conflicts between the trade and the climate regimes, including the conversion of the 
legal rules of the WTO and RTAs into a set of obligations supporting climate policy 
objectives.  However, given the reduced interest in the Doha Round negotiations, 
the prospects for legal reform are bleak.  Therefore, this Part not only identifies 
reform options, but also refers to processes that would enable a more pragmatic 
way forward in the absence of legal reform.  In our evaluation of options, we con-
sider if and how more certainty can be created by a suggested solution, and if the 
suggested change is more likely in the short term or in the longer term. 
We consider the following areas for supporting international and national 
climate policy by trade rules and regimes.  First, there could be explicit specifica-
tions and reforms on how the two regimes relate to each other, both under the WTO 
and in RTAs (Part IV.A).  Second, supporting trade rules for climate policy 
measures could be established for specific issues with a focus on the Paris Agree-
PHQW¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ3DUW,9%  Third, institutional cooperation could be in-
tensified in several ways (Part IV.C). 
A. GENERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLIMATE AND TRADE REGIMES 
1. ADDRESSING THE CLIMATE-TRADE OVERLAP THROUGH CHANGES 
IN THE WTO AGREEMENTS 
Legal guidance to clarify the relationship between WTO rules and climate 
policy measures is not easily achievable.  One argument in favor of reforming WTO 
rules is the case-by-case nature of WTO disputes does not provide sufficient struc-
tural legal guidance for the implementation of NDCs under the Paris Agreement, 
and leaves the settlement of climate-related disputes to a body that is guided first 
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and foremost by the rules of the multilateral trading system.222  If the demand for 
legal guidance increases, such guidance can only be provided by the WTO mem-
bers.223  There are several ways in which demands for legal services can meet this 
need. 
A first option is to amend WTO agreements to change the relevant trade 
rules.  Suggestions in this regard include amending Article XX of GATT to explic-
itly accommodate climate change measures or measures taken pursuant to multilat-
eral environmental agreements, or amending the SCM Agreement to provide space 
for green subsidies.224 
From a legal perspective, an ambitious reform of the legal framework 
through amendments or new rule creation would be attractive.  It would increase 
the legal certainty and normative coherence across regimes, and offer a solution for 
the long term.225  However, it is far from clear what the content of such rules would 
have to be to serve both climate and trade aims.  And even if there was clarity about 
the contents of an amendment, negotiating an amendment will be very challenging.  
Submitting an amendment already requires consensus, and depending on the con-
tents of the amendment (and the specific treaty provision it applies to), it will re-
quire at least a two-thirds majority of members accepting it, and in some cases, all 
members.226  Amendments may also lead to a complex legal situation²in which 
not all members are bound in the same way²if a sufficient number, but not all, of 
the WTO members accept it.227  Finally, practically speaking, amendments have 
hardly been used in WTO practice so far.228 
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A second option is to waive specific WTO obligations for a limited time.  
WDLYHUVZKLFKFDQEHDGRSWHGLIWKHUHDUH³H[FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV´229 require 
a three-fourths majority, although consensus has remained the rule in practice.230 
Examples for existing waivers include regional economic integration or justifica-
tion of non-reciprocal trade preferences for products from developing countries.231  
A WTO member could argue DFKLHYLQJFOLPDWHSROLF\REMHFWLYHVFRQVWLWXWHV³H[
FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV´$VSHFLILFDQGIDU-reaching suggestion is made by Bac-
chus, who suggests a waiver from WTO obligations for all trade-restrictive climate 
measures that are based on the amount of carbon used in making a product.232  This, 
for example, would be applicable to BCAs.  He further suggests a waiver for 
measures taken in furtherance of a UNFCCC climate agreement (e.g., the Paris 
$JUHHPHQWRUDSOXULODWHUDO³FOLPDWHFOXE.´233  A key question requiring clarifica-
tion is how to define the scope of the waiver, i.e., ZKDW DUH WKH DFWXDO ³Flimate 
PHDVXUHV´234 
The time-limited nature of waivers suggests a waiver will not create long-
term certainty.  At the same time, the temporary nature of a waiver might render it 
more appealing than a permanent amendment.  Feichtner points out a waiver allows 
for a general modification of WTO norms in the direction of non-economic inter-
ests.235  More precisely, it restricts the WTO jurisdiction in favor RI³RWKHULQWHUQD
tional legal regimes which may have greater competence and legitimacy than the 
WTO WRGHDOZLWKFHUWDLQLVVXHV´236 and which actually have a legal mandate that 
affects trade.237  If waivers were used repeatedly, this could also create a long-term 
effect for consideration of climate policy issues under the WTO.  Again, the limi-
tations to introducing a waiver are set by the political interests in doing so. If the 
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implementation of NDCs under the Paris Agreement would bring about structural 
issues that increase the pressure for waiving specific climate policy measures, the 
tool could offer a way forward, but it would not resolve structural, long-term con-
flicts. 
A third option is to adopt an authoritative interpretation of certain provisions 
in the WTO Agreements by a three-fourths majority (Article IX.2 of the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO), although also here consensus is the rule in practice.238  
Buck and Verheyen suggest members could agree certain regulations based on a 
SURGXFW¶V330VHJ, how much emissions are embedded in a product) would not 
violate the GATT, and this would effectively settle questions about the legality of 
PPMs.239  The far-reaching nature of this suggestion limits its political feasibility 
in practice.  However, an authoritative interpretation could offer an alternative to 
implement the suggestions for amendment²albeit with weaker legal force²such 
as clarifying the scope of Article XX of GATT.240  Another suggestion is a decla-
ration that climate measures taken pursuant to the Paris Agreement (or with refer-
ence to the UNFCCC) are measures within the scope of Article XX of the GATT 
and of Article XIV of the GATS.241 
The introduction of an authoritative interpretation of Article XX of GATT 
is less of an intervention in the regime than an amendment or a waiver.  An author-
itative interpretation would set a clear frame for the interpretation of Article XX 
and thus would document consensus among WTO members on the importance of 
climate-related policies under the WTO regime.  It would mainly affirm existing 
opinio juris around Article XX GATT, but by being explicit it could deter judicial 
action by opponents to specific climate action.242 
There are also downsides to authoritative interpretations. If an authoritative 
interpretation is very broad, for example referring to the Paris Agreement or to the 
NDCs in general, this could give a carte blanche for the protectionist application 
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of trade policy tools, given that climate action depends on national preferences and 
is subject to changing agendas and priorities.  In addition, an authoritative interpre-
tation cannot make non-trade rules directly applicable in a trade dispute.  However, 
it could help tilt the balance towards a climate-friendly interpretation of certain 
provisions of the WTO Agreements. 
Another way to give some leeway for WTO members when implementing 
their climate policies under the Paris Agreement would be a time-OLPLWHG³SHDFH
FODXVH´ IRU WDNLQJ DFWLRQ DJDLQVW WUDGH-related climate measures.243 ³>$@ SHDFH
clause could commit WTO members to wait at least three years before challenging 
national climate measures or [refrain from using] countermeasures that restrict 
traGHRURWKHUZLVHKDYHWUDGHHIIHFWVLQ:72GLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQW´244 A comparable 
clause had been in effect for nine years with respect to agricultural subsidies.245  
Hufbauer et al. suggest a similar clause could be used which focuses particularly 
on climate-related subsidies, though in principle such a clause could be used for 
any climate-related trade measure.246 
Alternatively, as suggested also by Hufbauer et al., a peace clause could 
commit states not to implement climate measures with extraterritorial implications, 
such as a BCA. 247   This may be helpful in creating trust and goodwill.  It may also 
be helpful for other countries affected to start gearing up for the measure. 
As with waivers, the challenge for a peace clause is to get the scope right. 
In other words, the challenge is to single out those measures that legitimately seek 
to implement the Paris Agreement or otherwise promote climate goals.  If one can 
get the scope right, a peace clause would buy time that could be used for construc-
tive dialogue rather than further confrontation over specific issues.248 Otherwise, a 
conflict only gets postponed and would return after the peace clause expires.249 The 
same argument applies if a peace clause hinders the reform of ineffective climate 
policy practices, such as generous free allocation of emission allowances under an 
ETS.250 
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An ill-formulated peace clause could also potentially offer countries a carte 
blanche, and thus create a perverse incentive for introducing protectionist or other-
wise trade-restrictive climate policy measures.251  A peace clause ultimately re-
quires amendment of the relevant WTO agreements, and is therefore subject to the 
same limitations as other amendments. 
A fourth option suggests adjustments to the WTO dispute settlement mech-
anism. Proposals exist to expand the jurisdiction of the WTO DSB to non-trade 
rules and principles, which could give climate obligations further weight as com-
pared to free trade disciplines in WTO judicial decision making.  However, such 
proposals are not likely to gain traction in the short term.  A more feasible proposal 
would be to ensure that the composition of WTO panels and the AB as such reflect 
the necessary technical expertise to cover climate-related issues (e.g., supporting 
the determination of whether a certain policy measure effectively contributes to 
greenhouse gas emission reductions). 
Finally, acknowledging the challenges of consensus, Hufbauer et al. pro-
pose a plurilateral trade and climate code to deal with a range of aspects on the 
climate-and-trade interface.252  They propose this code could be adopted as a pluri-
lateral agreement under Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement (similar to, for example, 
the Government Procurement Agreement).  Similarly, ICTSD has suggested a 
³6XVWDLQDEOH(QHUJ\7UDGH$JUHHPHQW´FRYHULQJQRWRQO\WKHOLEHUDOL]DWLRQRIFOL
mate-friendly goods and services, but also non-tariff barriers such as technical 
standards.253  A plurilateral agreement would not create rights or obligations for 
other WTO members, but its inclusion in Annex 4, which would allow for enforce-
PHQWRIWKHDJUHHPHQWWKURXJKWKH:72¶VGLVSXWHVHWWOHPHQWPHFKDQLVPGRHVUH
quire consensus.254  The benefits of such an agreement would normally accrue to 
all WTO members to the extent that it covered subjects within the scope of the 
MFN obligations of WTO agreements.255 Thus, on the one hand, the negotiation of 
an agreement inside the WTO system is easier due to the lower number of parties, 
but on the other hand, its approval as an additional Annex 4 agreement requires the 
agreement of all WTO members. 
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Such a plurilateral agreement under the WTO does not necessarily bring 
about more complexity²the GPA, for example, does not yield this effect.  The 
limited-membership arrangement would be open to participation by further WTO 
members and could thus expand its membership over time.  The EGA negotia-
tions²limited to traded goods²demonstrate plurilateral agreements may offer a 
way forward to promote common interests among groups of WTO members.  Plu-
rilateral climate-and-trade cooperation could also take place outside the context of 
the WTO regime. However, this option would exacerbate the fragmentation of the 
trade regime. 
2. ADDRESSING THE CLIMATE-TRADE OVERLAP THROUGH CHANGES 
IN RTAS 
RTAs have already demonstrated environmental standards could become part of a 
trade agreement.  RTAs could potentially further promote climate objectives in two 
ways.  First, the negotiation of new types of provisions could lead to synergies with 
climate goals, and prevent a race to the bottom.  Parties to an RTA have an interest 
in keeping up their national standards, because otherwise trade partners could 
quickly gain competitiveness through lowering standards.  Thus, RTAs can be more 
detailed and more elaborate in setting common rules for trade-related climate 
measures, in particular by aligning standards and regulations.  To ensure compati-
bility with WTO rules, it would be important for parties of an RTA to pay due 
regard to standards from third countries.256 In addition, dispute settlement rules and 
consultations could consistently relate to climate policy concerns, such as concerns 
regarding provisions on investment, which usually regulate whether and how an 
LQYHVWRUPD\FKDOOHQJHDFRXQWU\¶VFOLPDWHUHJXOations through investor-state dis-
pute settlement.257  Two overarching options to promote climate protection can be 
distinguished with regard to investment.  First, parties could preserve the flexibility 
for climate regulation. This could include narrowing down or clarifying key con-
cepts in international investment agreements²VXFKDV³LQGLUHFWH[SURSULDWLRQ´RU
WKH³IDLUDQGHTXLWDEOH WUHDWPHQW´VWDQGDUG²as well as extending exceptions (or 
creating new ones) to investment, removing climate regulations from the scope of 
investor-state dispute settlement.  Second, parties could agree on provisions en-
couraging low-carbon investment. These could include low-carbon performance 
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requirements for investors.258  Such provisions, however, need to be balanced 
against the objectives to attract and promote investment. 
 
If RTAs were to develop in this direction, they would hold the potential to 
facilitate multilateral agreements on climate-trade interactions in the longer term. 
The extent to which this potential can be realized depends on the parties to the RTA. 
The greater the market power of the parties negotiating specific standards, the 
greater the likelihood that such standards will be taken up elsewhere.  Other coun-
tries may do this on a unilateral basis, through the inclusion of standards in a greater 
number of RTAs, and ultimately, through multilateralization via the WTO.259  
There is thus a crucial role for the mega-regional agreements at a time of lower 
interest in rule development through the WTO.  Bilateral agreements, such as the 
EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, do not have this leverage.  Nevertheless, 
these smaller agreements can inject new ideas into the debate.  As negotiations on 
mega-regionals, such as TTIP are, ongoing, this offers an opportunity to facilitate 
trade in climate-friendly technologies between the US and the EU, and furthermore, 
ensure regulatory coherence, including aligning standards.  Other issues could be 
included as well, such as strengthening environmental laws and enforcement, and 
further promoting collaboration on climate-related issues, such as fossil fuel sub-
sidy reform.260 
 
Thus, RTAs could support climate policy measures through codifying 
standards and aligning rules among trade partners; by clarifying investment rules 
and related dispute settlement provisions; and by functioning as a clearing house 
for other trade and climate related issue areas. 
B. ADDRESSING THE CLIMATE-TRADE OVERLAP THROUGH CHANGES IN RULES 
ON SPECIFIC ISSUES 
The following discusses the prospects of reform for specific issues on the 
trade-climate interface, focusing on emissions trading and carbon pricing, energy 
subsidies, and technology transfer and intellectual property rights. 
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1. EMISSIONS TRADING AND CARBON PRICING 
Detailed rules for the international transfer of mitigation outcomes under 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement have yet to be elaborated.  Past research on the 
flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and domestic market-based instruments 
already indicated how mechanisms under Article 6 might intersect with interna-
tional trade law.261  A critical point relates to restrictions on the fungibility of carbon 
units based on criteria such as geographic origin (as applied to CDM credits under 
the EU ETS).  This could limit the ability of service providers to supply services 
related to ineligible units that would be considered like services related to eligible 
units, thus creating a conflict with GATS rules.  This issue could be resolved with 
one or more of the reform options discussed above (Part IV.A); for example, with 
an authoritative interpretation that restrictions on carbon units fall within the scope 
of Article XIV of the GATS. 
 
For the introduction of BCAs, there are two routes to establish a clearer 
legal status.  First, the design of BCAs can follow the non-discrimination principle 
of Article III of GATT and the requirements for an internal tax.  Second, if BCAs 
do not follow Article III of GATT in their setup, the Article XX criteria need to be 
applied, which demand that all alternative measures that are least trade-restrictive 
are exhausted. Article XX also demands that diversion from national treatment, 
based on non-product-related PPMs²here, embedded carbon²relates to prevent-
ing ineffective climate policy (carbon leakage).  The implementation of NDCs 
through national carbon pricing could bring back the discussion on specific rules 
on BCA.  For the time being, these two WTO routes could be explored if govern-
ments wished to use BCAs.  As the tool is politically highly sensitive, due to its 
protectionist potential, clearer codes of conduct would be helpful as well if its con-
sideration as part of NDC implementation became relevant.  In particular, the in-
troduction of BCAs ZRXOGQHHGWRHYDOXDWHGLQWKHOLJKWRID:72PHPEHU¶VDQWL-
leakage policies already in place, such as free allocation of emission allowances. 
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531, 531.. 
2. ENERGY SUBSIDIES 
In response to the issues raised by renewable energy subsidies, reform of 
WTO subsidy rules has been suggested, as well as the introduction of new agree-
ments on the promotion of renewables.262  On the one hand, the case law of WTO 
disputes over renewable energy policy implementation might offer guidance on 
how a productive balance could be found between a national agenda to promote 
renewable energy and international competition concerns.  On the other hand, the 
WTO agreements cited in the disputes comprise the GATT, the Anti-Dumping, 
TBT, TRIMS and SCM agreements, indicating conflicts with trade rules are pro-
found.  Local content requirements are a common feature of the disputes, and this 
should not be surprising.  Renewable energy production can yield several benefits 
that a domestic government aims for, including increasing employment.  Such in-
dustrial policy objectives are not covered by trade law, and solving the conflicts by 
changing the trade rules is not recommendable, given that protectionism can be a 
serious concern of trade partners.  Thus, the legal reform options²e.g., amend-
ment, waiver, peace clause, or authoritative interpretation263²would need to offer 
a solution that rules out their protectionist abuse.  More detailed reform suggestions 
in this direction include the creation of a category of narrowly defined non-action-
able subsidies²a positive list of support instruments and related design features²
to change the categories of subsidies under the SCM Agreement, or to establish 
disciplines for certain subsidies that are not covered yet.264 
Given the lack of clarity on fossil fuel subsidies, an important first step 
would be to enhance the transparency of such subsidies; for instance, by adopting 
a new notification template providing further details on subsidies in a standardized 
fashion265 and allowing non-governmental organizations to report on the level of 
                                                 
262 See Ilaria Espa & Sonia E. Rolland, Subsidies, Clean Energy, and Climate Change,  E15 TASK 
FORCE ON RETHINKING INT¶L SUBSIDIES DISCIPLINES 5 (Feb. 2015), https://e15initiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Subsidies-EspaRolland-FINAL.pdf . 
263 See e.g. Robert Howse, Securing Policy Space for Clean Energy under the SCM Agreement: 
Alternative Approaches, E15 EXPERT GROUP ON CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES & THE TRADE SYS-
TEM (Dec. 2013) 5, http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-CETs-Howse-Fi-
nal.pdf; see also Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, Enabling the Energy Transition and Scale-Up of Clean 
Energy Technologies: Options for the Global Trade System, E15 EXPERT GROUP ON CLEAN ENERGY 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE TRADE SYSTEM 7 (Jan. 2016), http://www3.wefo-
rum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Clean_Energy_Technologies_report_2015_1401.pdf (an authoritative in-
terpretation of Article XX outreach and application to the SCM Agreement).,. 
264 See Gary Horlick & Peggy A. Clarke, RETHINKING SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES FOR THE FUTURE E15 
TASK FORCE ON RETHINKING INT¶L SUBSIDIES DISCIPLINES 5-7 (Jan. 2016), http://e15initia-
tive.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15_no18_Subsidies_final_REV_x1.pdf. 
265 Steenblik and Simón supra note 233, at 9. 
non-actionable subsidies.266  Neither of these options would require changes in the 
:72¶VOHJDOIUDPHZRUN)XUWKHULQFHQWLYHVIRUUHIRUPFRXOGDULVHLIDIRVVLOIXHO
VXEVLG\ ZRXOG TXDOLI\ DV HLWKHU ³SURKLELWHG´ RU ³DFWLRQDEOH´267 meaning other 
WTO members can take action under the SCM Agreement, or if such subsidies 
could be challenged under the GATT or the TRIMS Agreement in the same way 
renewable energy subsidies have been challenged.  However, at present it seems 
quite unlikely WTO members are willing to renegotiate the subsidies regime to take 
into account the climate impacts of fossil fuel subsidies.  Although there has been 
progress in other areas of environmentally harmful subsidies, namely fisheries, the 
stakes are significantly higher in the case of fossil fuel subsidies,268 given the sheer 
size of such subsidies and given that almost every country in the world provides 
them. 
3. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The resolution of the different interpretation of IPRs and the different con-
cepts of intellectual property are often claimed as being the biggest hurdle for cli-
mate technology transfer, leaning on the examples of pharmaceuticals or defense 
technologies.  Suggestions for a reconciliation of the concerns, like the one submit-
ted by Ecuador in 2013, include modification of IPR rules or a declaration on intel-
lectual property and climate change in line with Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health.  The key aspect is the interpretation of TRIPS Arti-
cles 13 and 30 (use of patents), for which a waiver or an authoritative interpretation 
had been suggested.269  However, any solution needs to incorporate the concerns of 
both developing and developed countries, which will take a longer period of time.  
The debate at TRIPS Council on IPRs protection and interpretation will continue.  
Promoting climate protection is already a need that is integrated in the debate.  The 
underlying conflicts about IPRs however, block solutions to specific aspects of pro-
tection of climate technology and know-how.  The chances of resolving IPR issues 
                                                 
266 See Casier et al. supra note 117, at 12±13. 
267 See C. Wold et al., Leveraging Climate Change Benefits through the World Trade Organization: 
Are Fossil Fuel Subsidies Actionable?, 43 GEO. J. OF INT¶L L. 587, 656±57 (2012), pp. 656-657 
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269 See Ahmed Abdel Latif et al., , Overcoming the Impasse on Intellectual Property and Climate 
Change at the UNFCCC: A Way Forward, INT¶L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 1, 36±37 
(Nov. 2011), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/2012/02/overcoming-the-impasse-
on-intellectual-property-and-climate-change-at-the-unfccc-a-way-forward.pdf. 
seem bleak given the highly political nature of the debate, and the vested interests 
that dominate decision making. 
C. WAYS FORWARD: ACCOUNTING FOR THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
Given the hurdles to reform the WTO regime, or to align it with climate 
measures that are part of the Paris Agreement, other options should be considered 
that could bring about a more supportive role of the trade regime.  Politically more 
promising are options that integrate the procedures of the climate and trade institu-
tions, and deepen the existing procedural arrangements. 
1. IMPROVING THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Procedural reform could start with greater use of existing forums under the 
WTO and the UNFCCC as coordination hubs that actively engage parties on cli-
mate and trade issues.  There is already informal interaction between the UNFCCC 
Secretariat and the WTO members and institutions²in particular, the CTE.  A first 
step in that direction could include upgrading the roles for the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism, and the CTE of the WTO, as well as the Subsidiary on Body Scientific 
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) of the UNFCCC.  The Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism could be strengthened to include a compulsory assessment of the im-
pact of relevant domestic measures on emissions and efforts to address climate 
change.270  In addition, decision-making and administrative bodies in both the trade 
and climate regimes could seek to actively liaise in a systematic way, strengthening 
their knowledge base, and creating a better understanding of the implications of 
trade-climate interactions for the respective objectives, principles, and legal obli-
gations in each regime. 
To address interactions, Epps and Green suggest the introduction of a sepa-
rate WTO Committee on Trade and Climate Change.271  As an alternative option, 
the mandate of the CTE could be explicitly extended to include climate change 
policy, turning it into a Committee on Trade, Environment, and Climate Change.  
If this proves to be a feasible option for the WTO members to address trade-related 
climate policy issues in more detail, such a Committee on Trade, Environment, and 
Climate Change could include representatives from WTO members with distinct 
knowledge of UNFCCC issues. 
                                                 
270 See BACCHUS, supra note 234, at 16. 
271 EPPS & GREEN, supra note 109, at 261. 
2. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY THROUGH NOTIFICATION AND 
REVIEW 
To improve the flow of information around climate measures that affect in-
ternational trade or have the potential to do so, notification of such measures could 
be introduced in a formal manner; for example, by including in future NDC sub-
missions to the UNFCCC a section that highlights trade-related aspects of specific 
national climate actions.  Another option that could provide information also for 
the WTO committees would be to introduce at the UNFCCC Secretariat an infor-
mation hub through the creation of a central registry.  Parties to the UNFCCC could 
log and record trade-related climate measures, or even include such information in 
the transparency template guiding countries in their mandatory reporting under the 
Paris Agreement.  Such notifications can be sensitive.  However, enhanced trans-
parency is key for building trust between developing, emerging, and industrial 
countries.  The notification of trade-related climate measures could be linked to the 
work program of the UNFCCC improved forum on the impacts of the implementa-
tion of response measures.  Addressing trade issues in the forum will undoubtedly 
be challenging²as it has been in the past²but the more technical turn of the fo-
UXP¶VQHZZRUNSURJUDP may offer space for less politicized discussions. 
For specific issues, such as fossil fuel subsidies, and policies to promote 
renewable energy, the notification to the SCM Committee would help increase the 
transparency on such measures.  For issues that touch upon GATS legality, the 
evaluation of the classification of environmental services in the WTO Committee 
on Trade in Services could be undertaken.  This could aim at extending the WTO 
services classifications, with a view to coordinating negotiations on environmental 
goods trade with negotiations on related services, ultimately opening the door for 
greater legal certainty on climate-related services under the GATS. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The trade and the climate regimes have so far co-existed without severe 
frictions. With the recent emergence of a number of climate-related disputes and 
WKH3DULV$JUHHPHQW¶VHPSKDVLVRQQDWLRQDOO\GULYHQPLWLJDWLRQ WKHLQWHUDFWLRQV
between the policy fields could increase. Both regimes find themselves at a cross-
roads. This might lead to new opportunities to create rules and procedures that sup-
port trade-related climate policy measures. 
The climate regime has been considering trade-related aspects over the 
years of negotiations. The Paris Agreement, however, in contrast to the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol, does not include a provision stating how climate policy 
and trade rules relate to each other. Parties to the Paris Agreement have agreed 
instead to continue discussions on trade-related issues under the heading of re-
sponse measures. 
The WTO provisions can conflict with climate protection measures, if such 
measures discriminate between domestic and foreign goods, based on the processes 
and production methods involved. The likeness of goods and the equal treatment of 
WTO memberVDUHNH\IHDWXUHVRIWKH:72¶VQRQ-discrimination regime. How-
ever, there are also exceptions for the pursuit of environmental objectives. 
The WTO Agreements are increasingly put to the test by national climate 
policies that seek to promote renewable energy production and new technologies, 
or by conflicts over international IPR protection for clean technologies. Complica-
tions arise due to an increasing breadth of climate-related technologies trade and 
related services. WTO case law, while acknowledging the need for climate protec-
tion, sets clear signals against overly protectionist ways to support climate-friendly 
industrial strategies²foremost in conflicts over national renewable energy promo-
tion. The WTO dispute settlement bodies have been sensitive to environmental is-
sues, but they continue to encounter criticism from traditional trade interests. Thus, 
WTO members clearly signalling that dispute settlement must take climate protec-
tion seriously, would benefit the panels and the AB. 
Regional trade deals hold potential to show that countries anticipate the con-
flicts in promoting climate protection through standards and industrial policy. 
57$VDUHPRUHIOH[LEOHLQPHHWLQJWKHHQJDJHGSDUWQHUV¶SROLWLFDOSULRULWLHV7KXV
a benefit of the trend towards RTAs and mega-regional trade deals could be that 
climate policy objectives are given proper attention. 
The Paris Agreement will, over time, give rise to further questions in rela-
tion to trade. One issue concerns the market mechanisms and trading of interna-
tional emission reduction units. The potential of trade rules impeding the exchange 
of emission units seems low given the experiences under the Kyoto Protocol. Ra-
ther, related services (especially related to financial markets) need to be more 
clearly defined under the GATS. Another issue is the future treatment of imports 
and exports based on their PPMs. Such questions are more likely to come to the 
fore once targets and associated policies become more ambitious, and with the 
emergence of new coalitions to price carbon. BCAs have attracted political atten-
tion in the past already, and their application could become of interest again when 
national climate policies are strengthened. The expectation is national policies on: 
pricing emissions, energy production (including renewables and fossil fuels sup-
port), and on fostering specific technologies via trade will need to be coordinated 
with trade policy aims, thus putting demands on the institutions of the climate and 
the trade regimes. 
With more ambitious NDCs expected in the future, the trade-related climate 
measures will remain in the spotlight. The specific IPR issues need to be resolved, 
and talks under the TRIPS Agreement as well as rules in RTAs are key components 
of progress in this field. The adjustment of restrictive trade-related IPRs is a highly 
political matter, and this will dominate further negotiations under the WTO as well 
as the Technology Mechanism of the UNFCCC. Last, but not least, the reduction 
of fossil fuel subsidies will need more support from international institutions, in-
cluding the WTO, as their impact on climate change is considerable. 
We conclude by highlighting five particular ideas for how the trade rules 
and negotiations could become more supportive for climate protection: 
1. The WTO legal reform options lack political support. Nevertheless, 
we see an authoritative interpretation of Article XX (b) and (g) of the GATT, as 
well as its chapeau, as a way forward in the longer term. This could clarify the scope 
of exceptions to trade obligations, and it could also offer an important political sig-
nal that the WTO is open to accommodating the climate policies of its members. 
An authoritative interpretation would need to focus on issues that either have al-
ready been agreed through the WTO dispute settlement procedures or are likely to 
be commonly agreed.  
2. The dispute settlement system under the WTO could be made more 
VXSSRUWLYHIRUWKH3DULV$JUHHPHQW¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHPRUHFOLPDWH
expertise could be made part of the WTO dispute settlement processes. Article 13 
RI WKH:72¶V'LVSXWH6HWWOHPHQW8QGHUVWDQGLQJDVZHOODVVHYHUDORWKHU:72
agreements, already give the dispute panels the right to seek information and tech-
nical advice from experts²provided, of course, the relevant rules and procedures 
are followed. It is necessary to make use of this window as effectively and exten-
sively as possible. 
3. The negotiations of RTAs are a promising way forward for introduc-
ing and testing new rules on climate and trade. In particular, the so-called 
megaregional trade deals have a potential to diffuse climate protection rules more 
widely, as long as the negotiating parties have a common interest in avoiding a race 
to the bottom in setting climate protection standards.  
4. Plurilateral trade agreements that are incorporated as WTO agree-
ment (Annex 4 WTO Agreement) would offer a more WTO-specific option to set 
rules for trade and climate policy. WTO members who wish to bring environmental 
protection forward have already started the Environmental Goods Agreement. A 
broader trade and climate agreement, covering specific climate policy issues (e.g., 
market mechanisms, services, and non-tariff barriers), could further strengthen the 
promotion of climate protection through trade by progressive WTO members. 
5. The bodies of the WTO and the UNFCCC could increase transpar-
ency and accountability. To this end, an extended institutional setting at the WTO, 
for instance through a Committee on Trade, Environment, and Climate Change, 
would be an option. The UNFCCC Secretariat already has observer status with the 
CTE. Furthermore, the UNFCCC Secretariat is often also invited to the Special 
Sessions of the CTE on a meeting-by-meeting basis. However, there is still scope 
for increasing the coordination of existing bodies at the WTO (e.g., the CTE and 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism) and the UNFCCC (Subsidiary Body on Sci-
entific and Technological Advice, and the forum on the impact of the implementa-
tion of response measures). The aim should be a regular and elaborated exchange 
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the EU on im-




DS510 United States ± Cer-
tain Measures Re-
lating to the Renew-
able Energy Sector 
US India Not yet known Domestic content 
requirements and 
subsidies pro-





















Request for consultation by In-
dia.14 




1. Short title of the dispute, wherever available, is given within open brackets.  
2. Any WTO member - other than the complainant and the respondent - can declare that it has an interest in WKHFDVHDQGHQMR\VRPHULJKWVDVD³WKLUGSDUW\´
including participation in the proceedings, submission of written and oral testimony before the panel, etc. 
3. Susanne Droege, Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das and Michael Mehling The Trade System and Climate Action: Ways Forward under the Paris Agreement,  S.C. 
J. INT'L. L. & BUS. 14, 20. 
4. Id. 
5. Panel and Appellate Body reports in Canada ² Renewable Energy (DS412) and Canada ² Feed-In Tariff Program (DS426) were released together (effec-
tively merging the two cases). 
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